Innovation On A Budget The Development Of Military Technology During The Interwar Period, 1919-1939 by Deupree, William Erik
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 
2011 
Innovation On A Budget The Development Of Military Technology 
During The Interwar Period, 1919-1939 
William Erik Deupree 
University of Central Florida 
 Part of the History Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more 
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
STARS Citation 
Deupree, William Erik, "Innovation On A Budget The Development Of Military Technology During The 





INNOVATION ON A BUDGET: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY  












WILLIAM ERIK DEUPREE 






A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts 
in the Department of History 
in the College of Arts and Humanities 

















 This thesis investigates the progress of technological development during the interwar 
period of 1919 to 1939. The interwar period was a time of slashed military budgets and 
isolationist policies. However, despite political, financial, and organizational handicaps, each 
branch of the military made significant progress in the development of military technology, and 
the air corps and navy achieved significantly better results. The reason these two branches were 
able succeed was through a combination of organizational policy and the development of an 
overarching goal for their respective branch. Within this thesis, I investigated each of the major 
military branches during the interwar period, specifically the United States Army, Army Air 
Corps, and Navy. The air corps is considered a separate branch despite being a segment of the 
army due to its different strategic goal and its growing independence during the interwar period. 
 In my research I found that the army made by far the least technological progress, but did 
make significant strides in terms of the development of individual components for larger 
projects. For example, the army developed the M1 rifle and state-of-the-art shock absorbers for 
tanks. The air corps succeeded in transforming from a small army auxiliary made up of wood-
and-fabric biplanes into a largely independent branch of the military made up of all-metal 
monoplane bombers. The navy developed the aircraft carrier and aircraft to accompany the new 
ships, in addition to making substantial upgrades to existing ships. These upgrades included 
strengthening ships against torpedo attacks, making engines more efficient, and adding anti-
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 The First and Second World Wars were two of the most monumental events of the 
twentieth century. Conjointly, they left a lasting impression on the fields of international politics, 
both popular and academic history, literature, cinema, and popular culture. Almost anyone in 
America can talk about the major players on each side, the elementary causes of the wars, and 
most college graduates possess some understanding of how the end of the First World War set 
the stage for the Second. However, not many could explain what became of the United States‟ 
military between the two wars. 
World War I saw a number of major achievements in military technology. In this conflict, 
the armies amassed in Europe witnessed the first major use of machine guns and the introduction 
of military aircraft. The tank also appeared on the battlefield for the first time. The power, range, 
and accuracy of artillery increased dramatically. Submarines and aircraft added a third dimension 
to battles at sea, threatening ships from both below and above the ocean. The first proto-aircraft 
carriers appeared, formed by cutting the top off an existing ship and replacing it with a platform. 
Battleships, masters of the high seas, shelled each other from farther distances and with 
increasingly massive rounds. In a more subtle advance, trucks and other vehicles began to 
replace the horse as the primary method of transportation of men and material.  
 Twenty-one years after the 1918 cease-fire, World War II erupted, displaying a massive 
improvement in all these areas of military technology. Aircraft could fly faster and higher. Tanks 
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were more mobile, better armored, and at the forefront of the German blitzkrieg. Aircraft carriers 
challenged the battleship for mastery of the sea.  
 However, between these two conflicts, the United States military faced both internal and 
external resistance to technological developments, especially within the army. The period 
between 1918 and 1939 witnessed a return to pre-war organizational policies for the army, the 
emergence of isolationist politics, and a shrunken budget for all three branches. These events 
preceded a catastrophic economic crash that shook the foundations of the country. In addition, 
within the army, there were those who resisted further modernization of wartime tactics and war 
machines, preferring to continue using the tools that were proven failures even before America‟s 
entry into the First World War. However, during the two-decade period between 1919 and 1939, 
the United States military, especially the air corps and navy, managed to enact a number of 
substantial technological gains that greatly increased its ability to become the world power it is 
today. 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine how the United States military made 
technological advances in spite of both internal and external pressures against it, as well as why 
the air corps and the navy had much greater success than the army. It should be made clear that 
individual improvements to specific technology are not the focus, although specific examples 
will be used to highlight progress. Instead, this thesis will examine the individuals and 
institutions that made this progress possible in the face of the largely anti-military culture present 
in the 1920s and 1930s. I will attempt to answer the following question: how did the air corps 
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and navy overcome organizational, budgetary and political issues, and how did they manage to 
make progress despite these hurdles? In addition, why was the army so much less successful in 
this respect? Finally, how did the technological developments that originated in this era, 
specifically in the navy and air corps, permit the United States to successfully engage in World 
War II?  
The historiography of American military history for the first half of the twentieth century 
concentrates largely on the First and Second World Wars. However, the period between the wars 
is largely ignored, especially in the area of technological development; specifically in the areas 
of aircraft, aircraft carriers, tanks, artillery, and firearms. Most of the historiography on this 
subject either focuses on individual branch achievements, or simply points to the interwar 
period‟s isolationist policies and budget issues to explain why certain technologies were not 
developed. However, I believe that this is an oversimplification; many advances were made 
despite isolationism and budget shortfalls, especially in the air corps and the navy.  
This thesis is unique in that it identifies not only the technological developments that 
occurred during the interwar period, but also clarifies the difficulties and hurdles inherent in the 
political situation at the time, and how each military branch dealt with that reality. I explain how 
the air corps and the navy were able to make significant strides despite political problems by 
having a unified command structure and a common goal throughout the branch, which is an 
observation that has yet to be made in the field. In addition, I will show that the army was less 
successful in overcoming similar hurdles due to the lack of an efficient command structure and 
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overarching goal. Understanding how the various political, economic, and organizational factors 
worked together to hinder technological progress within the army is essential to understanding 
how the navy and air corps averted this same lack of progress. All three branches suffered budget 
cuts, all three faced isolationist policies, and all three, at least initially, were ruled by an 
inefficient command structure. Somehow, the air corps and navy successfully overcame these 
factors, while the army developed to a much lesser extent. 
To explain this disparity in achievement, I will primarily be relying on the annual reports 
published by the heads of each of the military branches. These include but are not limited to the 
annual reports of the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War in charge of procurement 
of materials, the Assistant Secretary of War for the US Air Corps, the US Army Chief of Staff, 
the Secretary of the US Navy and the Chief of US Naval Aviation. In addition to these reports, I 
will also use sources published by lower-rank individuals with special knowledge regarding 
technological and tactical progress. Among these is the naval periodical, the United States Naval 
Proceedings. Published by the navy and in print for nearly a century, it is a forum for naval 
officers to express their concerns about naval policy and publish their research, observations, and 
findings. Proceedings can, as a whole, be seen as a reflection of naval policy. I will also examine 
all of the treaties and acts which had a substantial impact on the performance and size of the US 
military. 
There is a fairly stunning lack of historical work done on technological progress itself in 
the interwar period, considering how much the progress influenced how World War II was 
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fought. Most of what can be found on the subject must be gleaned from works either covering a 
much longer period of time, or works written about World War II. The leading work on the 
subject, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, edited by Williamson Murray and Allan 
Millet, does focus specifically on this era, but primarily from a British and German perspective, 
using American innovation only as a comparison.
1
 
For general military texts, Russell Weigley‟s The American Way of War and, Benjamin 
Rhodes‟s United States Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period are essential texts.
2
 Weigley 
discusses the strategies for both the air corps and the navy, and the technological advances 
associated with those strategies. Rhodes focuses on the diplomatic side of the interwar period, 
and explains the domestic policies that deeply affected actions of the various military branches. 
Harold Winton‟s and David R. Mets‟s The Challenge of Change, Edward Coffman‟s The 
Regulars, Weigley‟s History of the United States Army, and George Hofmann‟s Through 
Mobility We Conquer discuss the army‟s technological developments.
3
 Weigley provides a good 
general overview of the technology of the period, while Winton, Mets, and Hofmann describe 
the failure of the army to adapt to the new technological realities following World War I. 
Coffman gives a view of life within the army from the trooper‟s perspective and the struggles 
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associated with a peace-time isolationist army. The weakness of these three texts is the lack of 
discussion about the combination of a funding deficit, poor organization, personal ideologies, 
and how these factors combined to hinder technological progress.  
Robert Love Jr.‟s History of the U.S. Navy is the preeminent book for naval history, but is 
fairly general simply because of its scope; it covers the period from 1775 to 1941.
4
 There are a 
number of supplemental sources, most describing the rise of the aircraft carrier, but many of 
those works focus primarily on World War II and later. The air corps has a plethora of secondary 
sources, most of them focusing on Billy Mitchell, the air corps deputy director and public face 
during the 1920s, but also many focusing specifically on the new technological developments. In 
terms of the historiography, this is a small, but very important, hole to fill: despite the air corps 
being part of the army, their fates were quite different in this period, and there is no 
historiographical work on that topic. 
 Within this thesis, I will be looking at each of the major military branches of the interwar 
period, specifically the United States Army, Army Air Corps, and Navy. The air corps will be 
considered a separate branch despite being part of the army due to its different strategic goal and 
its growing independence during the interwar period. The marines are not included because they 
were, at the time, not a major branch and did not meaningfully expand until after World War II 
began. 
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This work will be divided into three chapters, each focusing on the army, air corps, and 
navy. By dividing the chapters by service, rather than chronologically, it avoids the confusion 
caused by the lack of clear-cut lines in the chronology shared by all three branches. For example, 
one could consider the years 1935-1939 important for the air corps due to the introduction of the 
General Headquarters Air Corps; an important step in the air corps‟ move towards independence 
from the army. However, these dates would not significantly affect the navy or army. For the 
sake of clarity, each chapter will begin at the end of the First World War and conclude at the 
resumption of hostilities in Europe in 1939. Although the United States did not enter World War 
II until 1941, with the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, America rapidly began a 
rearming program across all the branches, ending the political and budgetary characteristics that 
define the interwar period.  
Within this paper, I will show that, despite budget cuts, isolationist government policies, 
and organizational issues, each branch of the military was able to make technological progress. 
However, the navy and air corps achieved much more success by overcoming their 
organizational issues and finding a goal to unite the branch. The army‟s reversion to an 
antiquated command system that divided authority rather than concentrating it became the first in 
a series of blows that ended any hope of the army exiting the interwar period as a world power. 
When Congress cut both the army‟s budget and manpower in the early 1920s, this inefficient 
system was not able to work together to form a unified goal for the army; instead, each 
department continued to only work their projects, often at the expense of other departments. In 
addition, several of the department heads did not believe in the mechanization of the army, and 
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preferred to continue to rely on animal-power. This further limited any potential progress the 
army could have obtained. 
The army‟s air service found itself in an even worse manpower and budget situation than 
its parent branch at the end of World War I, and rapidly began to run out of both planes and 
pilots to fly them. However, through the efforts of one of its senior officers, Billy Mitchell, army 
pilots proved that air power had a real potential military application. Over the course of the 
interwar period, the air corps unified its command structure and gained more and more 
independence from the army, in terms of funding, purpose, and command. Because of this 
independence, the air corps succeeded in progressing on a number of technological fronts and 
built itself a niche within the military establishment. 
The navy did not find itself mired in budgetary squalor immediately after World War I; in 
fact, it continued to expand. In addition, shortly after the end of the war, the navy did away with 
the same inefficient command system that would plague the army for the next two decades. 
However, in the early 1920s, Congress enacted an international naval treaty that limited the 
number of ships the navy could build and severely cut its budget. In response, the navy 
developed a philosophy of quality-over-quantity, and worked to improve its ship‟s systems as 
much as possible. In addition, after the air corps showed the potential of air power, the navy 
developed the aircraft carrier and the aircraft to go with it. 
It is clear that air corps and navy succeeded in developing technologically by creating an 
efficient command structure, and then finding a goal for the entire branch to strive for. The air 
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corps found a place for itself within the military establishment, and when the navy could not 
build more ships, they instead made the ships they had better. The army, lacking both of these 
qualities, did not succeed in developing new technology at any meaningful rate, and ended the 
interwar period technologically stunted. 
In the current era of massive military budgets, growing national debt, and a weariness of 
war on the part of both soldiers and civilians in America, it is entirely possible that we may be 
entering another age of isolationism in the United States. At the very least, the military is facing 
potentially large cuts to their research and development programs. As of April 2011, President 
Barak Obama plans to reduce military spending by up to $400 billion over the next ten years.
5
 
Other cuts proposed by members of Congress could reach up to $1 trillion, or twenty percent of 
the military‟s total budget.
6
 With the potential of deep budget cuts in its future, the military 
establishment would be wise to look to its past and examine how their predecessors succeeded 
(and failed) in developing technologically during the interwar period in the face of a smaller 
budget and a war-weary nation.  
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 Many of the military‟s successes and failures during the interwar period can be traced to 
events that occurred between the turn of the century and the beginning of World War I. During 
this time, the existing branches of the military that are discussed underwent many changes that 
paved the way for the changes in technology – and implementation – that occurred at a later date. 
In order to completely understand how the military branches performed in the task of 
technological development, it is necessary to first briefly look back at the events that each branch 
underwent preceding the interwar period. 
Prior to World War I, both the army and the navy operated under what was known as the 
bureau system. Under this system, the army and navy split themselves into departments, each in 
charge of a specific aspect of their branch. The problem with the bureau system was that each 
individual bureau focused only on the needs, requirements, and goals of its own department, and 
would ignore the needs and goals of other departments and the branch as a whole. When the 
military remained small and did not require much in the way of equipment or ordinance, the 
system did work. However, when the military rapidly expanded in the face of World War I, the 
bureau system simply could not keep up with demand. Aviation eventually became a department 
in both the army and the navy, and played a role in how each branch dealt with the inefficiencies 
of the bureau system. 
The army‟s use of the bureau system greatly affected its readiness for the first world war. 
Following the Spanish-American War, the army moved from being essentially a frontier police 
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force to an imperial power, with responsibilities both in the Caribbean and Pacific Rim.
7
 
Between 1903 and 1916, the army expanded in size through a series of congressional acts, 
beginning with the Dick Act of 1903 and ending with the National Defense Act of 1916, the last 
act passed before America‟s entrance into World War I.
8
 However, even these expansions left 
America unprepared for the war. America entered the war on April 6, 1917 with an army of 
127,588 men with an additional 181,620 national guardsmen, for a total of 309,208 men at arms. 
As a comparison, in the same month the French and Germans lost a combined 290,000 men 
during the Battle of Aisne.
9
 
 In 1917, the army underwent a monumental expansion program to meet the manpower 
requirements of World War I. At this time there were as many as eight different, yet concurrent, 
systems in place for estimating the requirements of the army, including the Bureau of Ordinance, 
the Quartermaster Division, the Corps of Engineers, the Signal Corps, the Medical Department, 
the Construction Division, the Air Service (which, while part of the signal corps, was large 
enough during the war to have political weight), and the Chemical Warfare Service.
10
 In 
addition, there was no system for determining priority between the bureaus and no system for 
traffic management of raw materials entering manufacturing plants or finished products 
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departing to the front. 
11
 Because of this, in the eighteen months that America participated in 
World War I, not one American-made gun was made in sufficient quantity to supply the 
American Expeditionary Force; America‟s allies in Europe were forced to provide nearly all of 
the Americans‟ equipment. America‟s manufacturing capability was up to the task of producing 
the needed materials, but because of a lack of coordination between bureaus, some key 
components went unmanufactured, and others sat completed in warehouses but were not 
transported to their final destinations.
12
 In fact, the number of 1903 Springfield rifles produced 
before America‟s entry into the war was higher than the number produced after, when the war 
department took over production regulation.
13
  
In response to the problem of inefficiency, the army reorganized itself from a system of 
departmental leadership to one where the various departments reported directly to the chief of 
staff, under the leadership of the chief of staff, Gen. Peyton C. March. The chief of staff position, 
originally created in 1903, had been growing slowly in power since that time and the efficiency 
crisis in World War I resulted in the army putting each bureau under the chief of staff‟s direct 
command. By replacing this bureau system with the chief of staff system, the army was able to 
have top-down leadership in terms of weapons development, logistics, and general strategy. This 
is opposed to having multiple bureau chiefs with the same level of authority fighting over 
resources and pursuing their own interests independent of each other. While the bureaus still 
existed, their chiefs all reported to the chief of staff and his general staff, who determined an 
                                                          
11
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overarching strategy for all the bureaus.
14
 The efficiency of the army was greatly improved, 
especially in terms of logistics. 
Part of the army‟s expansion in the two decades prior to World War I included the 
introduction of military aircraft. The practical application of flight was still less than fifteen years 
old, and while aeronautical technology improved rapidly in that twenty years, the aircraft were 
still quite primitive. At the time aircraft entered military service, they were made of wood and 
canvas, and could not fly very far or fast. At the beginning of the first world war, airplanes were 
used solely as reconnaissance tools, and air-to-air combat happened almost accidently, beginning 
with one soldier using a rifle in the back seat of a scout, and ending the war with such ferocity 
that the term “dog fighting” was used to describe it.
15
 
The air corps as an independent branch did not exist in 1918. Instead, all army aircraft 
were part of the army air service, which in turn was part of the army signal corps.
16
 The signal 
corps was the army department tasked with establishing communications between units, as well 
as reconnaissance and was not often directly involved with combat. Although aircraft at this time 
were still primitive and were used mostly for reconnaissance, with some limited ability to fight 
other aircraft or bomb ground targets, some within the air serive believed it had a much greater 
potential.
17
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The United States Navy underwent an expansion very much like the army during the two 
decades before to World War I. Prior to the Spanish-American War, the navy grew into a two-
ocean force connected by the Panama Canal and by the end of that war the American navy was 
considered among the best in the world. Naval commanders began to envision the day that the 
U.S. Navy would be on par with the British fleet.
18
 
The outbreak of hostilities in Europe provided the justification for further expansion.
19
 
President Wilson implemented a massive naval expansion program in 1916, and America‟s 
involvement in the North Atlantic gave the navy valuable wartime experience.
20
 In addition, the 
navy had long been planning for an offensive war with Japan and had devised a strategy called 
War Plan ORANGE to deal with that potential conflict. This hypothetical plan was constantly 
updated as new information and technology became available.
21
 The navy was, however, limited 
by the same type of antiquated command system that hindered the army‟s efficiency before and 
during World War I. During the war, this system caused a number of readiness and supply 
problems, greatly affecting the navy‟s performance in the North Atlantic. At the end of the war, 
the navy‟s commanders realized that they had a problem, and set out to fix it.
22
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At the end of this period, the army overcame its inefficient command structure and 
replaced it with a much more efficient system headed by the army chief of staff. The air service 
still remained a part of the signal corps, and its full potential had not yet been realized. The navy, 
in terms of numbers, was one of the most powerful navies in the world, but remained under the 
control of the same bureau-style command structure the army had cast off. In the next three 
chapters, however, the navy‟s numbers will be cut, but its efficiency and power will improve. 
The air service will grow into a powerful and largely independent arm of the military. And the 




ARMY: BUDGETS AND BICKERING 
Of the three branches of the military, the army was the least successful at the goal of 
developing necessary military technology during the interwar period. The reason for this was 
three-fold. First, the organizational structure of the army was inefficient, plagued with 
overlapping goals, red tape, bickering, and a lack of a unified command structure. This problem 
was greatly exacerbated by the funding problems that formed in the wake of World War I and 
the rise of isolationist politics designed to keep America out of another European war. Of the 
three branches, the army was the hardest hit by budget cuts due to its perception by Congress and 
the general public as a solely “offensive” organization with no place in peacetime. The sparse 
funds given to the already inefficient system created a perfect storm that would follow the army 
well into the Second World War. This chapter will show that a combination of political, 
budgetary, and organizational factors greatly hindered the army‟s ability to develop new 
technology to keep pace with the rest of the world, and the technology it did develop was not 
manufactured in sufficient numbers to allow it to be used effectively. 
When Gen. March took over as chief of staff in 1918, he recognized the problems 
inherent to an independent bureau system and set out to correct them. The Overman Act of May, 
1918 gave him the authority to make sweeping changes to the army‟s structure and bureaucracy 
for the duration of the war.
23
 His first step was reorganizing the goals of the existing bureaus to 
eliminate any redundancy between them. Second, he created new bureaus to manage any duties 
that the existing departments were not equipped or designed to handle. Finally, March 
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reorganized and expanded the army general staff to act as a manager for the bureaus in order to 
direct their strategy as a cohesive unit.
24
  This reorganization, in the form of the Division of 
Purchase, Storage, and Traffic, proved to be very effective and greatly increased the efficiency of 
the army during World War I by putting the formation of army policy in the hands of one man, 
the chief of staff, rather than having the bureau chiefs operate independently and without any 
central plan or guidance.
25
 Because the chief of staff and his general staff had complete control 
over the bureaus, they were able to rid themselves of the red tape, redundancy, and logistical 
inefficiency that had plagued the previous system. For example, after Gen. March initiated his 
reforms, the amount of supplies shipped to Europe in naval convoys increased by 100,000 tons a 




LESSONS LEARNED, LESSONS FORGOTTEN 
The army learned many lessons from World War I. First, the necessity of general staff 
control was made abundantly clear. The various bureaus needed a controlling force to focus their 
efforts. Second, the advantages of having a stockpile of both clothing and equipment to supply 
the army until the economy shifted to a war footing became evident. Third, the country needed a 
larger standing army, especially with experienced officers. New troops and officers took too long 
to train and more importantly, even longer to gain experience. March was an advocate of 
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universal conscription, believing that every man of age and ability should serve a term in the 
army. In March‟s opinion, the size of the peace-time army would not differ greatly from a 
wartime army. Fourth, the army would benefit from the organization of special services such as 
the Tank Corps and Air Service, whose duties could not be duplicated by regular troops. Finally, 
World War I crystallized the necessity of large-scale tactical training using a combination of 
infantry, artillery, armored, and air units. This is related to the need for experience; the army 
needed to be prepared to go to war at any time and could not rely on gaining experience under 
fire alone.
27
 Unfortunately, most of these lessons would be forgotten early in the 1920s. 
In 1921, the army underwent a major reorganization under the guidelines of the National 
Defense Act of 1920. This act was one of many isolationist policies made in the wake of World 
War I with a desire to “return to normalcy” and to stay out of European affairs.
 28
 The army‟s 
size was limited to a peace-time maximum of 200,000 men (and would remain below 125,000 
after 1922), the tank corps was abolished and tanks (and their crews) relegated to the infantry 
department. The army‟s budget was set at $396,000,000, a billion dollars below its wartime 
budget, and, after adjusting for inflation, only $100,000,000 higher than its 1914 budget.
29
 This 
was in spite of a larger (by 40,000 men) standing army compared to 1914, and the new 
requirements of armored and aerial warfare.
30
 In addition, the role of the chief of staff was 
                                                          
27
 March, Annual Report, 241-245. 
28
 Raymond Clapper, “Map Out Course for Return to Normalcy” Washington Reporter, Jul 27, 1921, 1.; Norman 
Mackenzie, “Abandonment by U.S. of Isolationist Policies Predicted at Sydney,” The Leader Post, Sep 19, 1938, 5. 
29
 “National Defense,” Reading Eagle, Dec. 3, 1929, 14.; “Congress Faced With Budget Half Billion Below First 
Estimate,” Herald-Journal, Dec. 6, 1921, 4. 
30
 “National Defense,” Reading Eagle, Dec. 3, 1929, 14. 
19 
 
marginalized as the bureau directors once again took control of army policy.
31
 March‟s proposed 
500,000-man army was rejected by Congress, both due to unpopularity of the plan among 
civilians and because of his political enemies on Capitol Hill. March had been blunt with 
Congress during the war regarding the need of an increased military presence at all times; the 
unpopularity of this statement allowed his political enemies to gain traction in their fight against 
him. He was accused of wanting to maintain a high troop count only because his fellow officers 
wanted to maintain their wartime brevet (temporary) ranks. The final nail in the coffin was when 
Representative John Miller of Washington asked what enemies the United States had to justify 
such a large army. March was unable to answer satisfactorily, essentially implying that because 
the army had the resources to train that many, it would be a shame to not do so.
32
 Gen. John 
Pershing, hero of the American Expeditionary Force in World War I, helped to hammer in that 
final nail when he stated that the maximum amount of soldiers for a peace-time army should be 
no more than 300,000.
33
 In March‟s final Annual Report, he wrote that should the army drop 
below 200,000 men, it would simply not be able to perform all the tasks relegated to it, and listed 
the non-combative requirements of each department; of the 200,000 allotted men, 150,000 were 
largely non-combat positions. Therefore, a 200,000-man army would only have 50,000 combat 
troops.
34
 March retired in 1921; he was succeeded by the same Gen. Pershing who had 
denounced him.  
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The return to the bureau system was for reasons both fiscal and ideological. The US 
government had just spent trillions of dollars on the war effort. In addition to this spending, the 
government was still locked into billions of dollars of wartime contracts. If these contracts had 
been immediately cancelled, it would have meant a complete collapse of an economy still 
entirely on a war footing. Therefore, money had to be saved somewhere. Research and 
development programs were slashed, as was the size of the armed forces. An army of over 
2,000,000 soldiers in 1918 had been cut to 280,000 by 1920 and to 125,000 by 1922.
35
 
Ideologically, the bureau system was seen as more democratic, “American” and capitalist. The 
army was to be run like a corporation, with each bureau chief acting as a member of a board of 
directors for the army.
36
 This reaction makes sense if the Communist Revolution in Russia and 
the resulting Red Scare in the United States is considered.  
The marginalization of the position of chief of staff and the return of the bureau heads to 
power essentially returned the army‟s command structure to the status quo ante. Although the 
chief of staff position still existed and his general staff still advised the various bureaus, they no 
longer had direct control, allowing the bureau commanders to regain their control over their 
departments. In addition, the board of directors mentality never materialized and the bureau 
chiefs concentrated only on their respective departments. This left the army with the same 
command issues it had experienced before and during the war, with the additional problem of 
implementing a program of mechanization and modernization.  
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The invention of the tank and the use of mechanized transportation had greatly changed 
how battles were fought by increasing the speed of armed conflicts at both tactical and strategic 
levels; each bureau would have to find a way to approach this new reality. Unfortunately, each 
bureau only concentrated on its own specific area and gave little thought to a branch-wide 
strategy; the infantry concentrated on the infantry, cavalry on cavalry, and artillery on artillery, 
with very little thought for the integration of tactics. Under a strong chief of staff, the army may 
have been able to focus on these issues as a cohesive unit as they had done in the latter stages of 
World War I, rather than focusing on them individually. Even worse, the army had started the 
war with eight different bureaus. After the National Defense Act, it had seventeen, adding to the 
inefficiency of the system. In addition, Congress was not willing to provide enough funding to 
fill the 200,000 soldier cap set by the National Defense Act of 1920; funding was also not 
appropriated for research and development purposes.
37
 
ANIMALS OVER ENGINES, TROOPS OVER TANKS 
 Another problem was that, in many cases, the heads of the bureaus were unwilling to 
admit that mechanization was necessary at all and remained proponents of an army powered 
primarily by animals, not engines. This was especially true for the leaders of the cavalry and 
artillery departments. The cavalry was struggling to justify its existence after World War I 
proved the obsolescence of horses on the modern battlefield.
38
 Machine guns and vastly 
improved artillery had made the classic cavalry charge suicidal, which left horse cavalry without 
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a role on the modern battlefield. The artillery continued working on firing farther, faster, more 
accurately, and with more damage, but was constrained by a lack of mechanization, making it 
harder to move larger guns and shells. In addition, artillery had suffered a “period of diminishing 
returns” in World War I. This means that, at a certain point, the amount of effective damage done 
per shell fired started to go down, and therefore the monetary cost of a bombardment went up 
exponentially.
39
 By 1922, all research into mechanized artillery had been halted and all 
motorized artillery units had been deactivated.
40
 
The Infantry was still considered the most important section of the army and did little to 
further develop the tank. The Field Service Regulations of 1923 stated “the special mission of all 
other arms are derived from their powers to contribute to the execution of the infantry mission” 
and that “infantry is the essential arm of close combat.”
41
 Both the cavalry and the air service 
were relegated solely for purposes of reconnaissance, and there was no mention of the two 
working together toward these ends.  
Tanks, which had been reassigned to the infantry in 1920, were largely laid by the 
wayside in the years immediately following their reassignment. Tanks were effectively forced to 
weigh less than 15 tons due to the Ordinance Department‟s unwillingness to modify pontoon 
bridges to carry more weight (the 1917 Mark VIII Liberty tanks, for example, weighed in at 37 
tons and could not use pontoon bridges).
42
 Instead of focusing on quickly developing new, light 
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tanks, the army focused more on building armored cars for Mexican border patrol, which were 
much cheaper and easier to design and construct.
43
 The cars were only “armored” in the most 
liberal sense of the word. The Pontiac T1 and Cadillac T2, first built in 1928, were nothing more 
than standard civilian vehicles stripped down to base components, with very light armor added 
and a machine gun attached.
44
 These armored cars could not replace the need for tanks in 
warfare, due to their inadequate armor and armament.  
Tank design theory in the 1920s was split between two different approaches; a “light” 
tank (or armored car) designed to cover and accompany an infantry charge and a “leading” heavy 
tank designed to spearhead a large assault. These were two very different roles and would have 
been performed best by two separate vehicles designed exclusively to perform them. The army‟s 
Caliber Board, however, elected to design a medium tank able to use existing pontoon bridges 
rather than design a heavy spearheading tank or a light infantry-support tank. The first medium 
tank, the Medium A, was a vehicle that incorporated many design features that would continue in 
American tanks for the next three decades. These developments included the twin-turret 
arrangement, which placed a small machine-gun turret above the main gun turret. However, after 
the Medium A was built, the infantry decided to concentrate instead on light tanks and armored 
cars, leading to a decline in the „medium tank‟ design.
45
 The chief of the infantry did not support 
tank design, believing that the infantryman still held the primary role in ground warfare, and 
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actively censored subordinates who supported tank design; these subordinates included both 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and George Patton, who used tanks to great effect in World War II.
46
    
Despite a general reluctance against technological development due to both funding 
shortages and the entrenchment of pre-world-war ideas and tactics among high-ranking officers, 
some officers within the army did advocate for mechanization. In 1928, the general staff 
conducted an extensive study under the command of Col. O.S. Eskridge, a member of the tank 
section of the infantry department. The test was designed to study the potential of a mechanized 
force and was essentially a hodgepodge of various trucks, tracked vehicles, artillery, and the few 
modern tanks the army possessed. The test, summarized by Capt. John Christmas of the 
automotive section of the Ordnance department, succeeded on many levels and highlighted 
where improvements were needed. The hodgepodge of vehicles caused some problems, with the 
mechanized column being forced to slow or stop to allow slower or broken vehicles to catch up. 
However, the column still made a 75-mile “daily march,” meaning the mechanized column, 
despite delays, was able to move about 75 miles a day, which is between three and five times 
faster than a non-mechanized column. Christmas took several lessons from this test: that vehicle 
uniformity was essential to keep columns moving efficiently, that aviation would be needed to 
support an armored column due to the column‟s vulnerability from air attacks, and that a 
mechanized force needed specially trained men to do the job properly.
47
 In addition, Christmas 
proposed several tactical and strategic theories based on this test, many of which were very 
similar to what would become the Blitzkrieg; using tanks to punch a hole through the enemy line, 
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and bringing up infantry both in armored troop carriers and on foot to hold the position.
48
 
Christmas concluded that the advantages of a mechanized force greatly outweighed the 
disadvantages (high cost and terrain limitations).
49
 
Despite these recommendations for and the benefits of a mechanized force, such a force 
never developed outside the experimental regiment. Rather than develop a technologically 
superior army, with an emphasis on tanks, the army elected to focus on the development of 
armored cars. These armored cars were cheaper and faster than modern tanks, but had much less 
armor and firepower. They would have been used primarily for defense along the Mexican 
border; however, they were never deployed in large numbers. Interdepartmental bickering 
between the infantry, cavalry, and ordinance departments hindered the armored car‟s 
development up into the 1940s and the Second World War.
50
  
The Christie convertible tanks were a prime example of the effects of the lack of 
cooperation between departments.
51
 The 1928 Christie was a revolutionary design for its time, 
able to drive at speeds up to 70 mph on wheels and 42.5 mph on tracks, which was twice as fast 
as the model T1 that the army was using as its standard armored car. The infantry purchased a 
total of eight of the tracked version and the cavalry bought four of the wheeled “combat car” 
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 These amounts did not come close to providing an adequate number of armored 
vehicles for the army. 
The bickering began in 1933 when the Ordinance Department developed an updated 
version of the Christie. It was 4 tons heavier and much more powerful. However, it had some 
problems because of the Ordinance Department‟s insistence that it be able to run with both 
wheels and tracks, causing steering complications. In hindsight, the wheeled version should have 
been abandoned due to the complication of creating a drive system capable of handling both 
wheels or tracks and the limited utility of the wheeled version. However, the infantry demanded 
a tracked version and the cavalry the faster wheeled version. Rather than either fixing the 
problems or proceeding with only the tracked version, the project was abandoned completely in 
the United States (although the Soviet Union purchased the design and made good use of it.)
53
  
President Herbert Hoover‟s military policies during his administration (1929-1933) 
further hindered the mechanization of the army and the development of tanks. Hoover wanted to 
adopt a policy of „hemispheric defense,‟ which ran in line with the current isolationist 
tendencies. He planned for a quick expansion of the military during war time, but during 
peacetime to maintain only enough military power to defend the Western Hemisphere. He 
advocated for the mechanization of the peacetime army, but he also advocated a 40 percent 
expansion of the air corps and took the money to fund this expansion from the infantry and 
artillery departments. The air corps received $3 million for new aircraft. The rest of the army 
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could only allocate $626,000 to new construction, and split that money with maintenance costs 
for the national guard and an increased troop ration.
54
 The resulting budget crisis for the rest of 
the army was so critical that it lost the ability to adequately defend the Western Hemisphere, let 
alone project force anywhere else. In addition, the higher air corps funding further strained the 
already tense relationships between departments.
55
  
Chief of staff Charles Summerall wrote in 1929 that the army was unprepared for a war 
in the following areas: mobilization, aircraft, harbor defense, anti-aircraft, selective service, new 
weaponry (both in R&D and production), rearmament, and intelligence on the activities of 
foreign armies.
56
 In his final report as chief of staff made the following year, Summerall 
unequivocally denounced the bureau system, stating that “the defect of divided authority, which 
brought about great confusion during [World War 1], had been completely eliminated under a 
system of General Staff control, when unity of authority and responsibility under the chief of 
staff was fully achieved.”
57
 
COMPONENTS ARE DEVELOPED AS TRAINING DRAGS 
In 1930, Gen. Douglas MacArthur took over the position of chief of staff. At the time, the 
army consisted of only 12,000 officers and 118,750 enlisted men, nearly 70,000 fewer than the 
minimum stated by Gen. March nine years before. Like March, MacArthur restated that because 
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certain administrative offices must be filled, the majority of the manpower shortages were felt by 
the fighting elements, hindering both the efficiency of these units and their ability to defend the 
nation. He wrote that, even by cutting “mobilization and administrative nuclei to the bone and 
(reducing) foreign and coast defense garrisons to dangerously low figures,” the bare minimum 
manpower for the army must be 14,000 officers and 165,000 enlisted.
58
  
Unlike March and his immediate predecessor, Summerall, MacArthur supported the 
bureau system, especially in the areas of research and development of mechanization and 
motorization. He did advocate a “General Council” of bureau chiefs to help curtail overlap, but 
this seems simply a rebranding of the ineffective board-of-directors organization of a decade 
before.
59
 This raises the possibility that MacArthur either received his appointment to the chief 
of staff position because of his political beliefs, or that he was pressured to support the system in 
order not to make waves.  
MacArthur did write in his chief of staff reports that the army had made steady progress 
on a variety of technological fronts. However, the development and procurement of these 
technologies had been severely handicapped by the lack of funding available to the army. In the 
early 1930s, the army, aside from a small number of new tanks and armored cars, still largely 
used equipment left over from World War I; much of this equipment was approaching 
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 Other World War I surplus equipment, while still usable, was 
obsolete to the point that if an emergency arose, it could not be used effectively against an enemy 
armed with modern equipment.
61
  
At the time that Gen. MacArthur took over as chief of staff, the United States had several 
hundred tanks remaining from World War I, but only twelve tanks that could be considered 
modern (mostly Medium As and Christies) - only one of which was operational. New tanks were 
capable of 40 mph on roads and 20 mph off-road (the 1917 Liberty tank, by comparison, reached 
a top speed of 5mph under ideal conditions). However, it cost all of the army‟s available funds to 
procure one working model.
62
 All of the new tanks were critically under-armed, having nothing 
heavier than a .5-inch machine gun or a 1.5-inch cannon, which was not large enough to be 
effective against other tanks
63
 The army‟s meager efforts to procure more technologically 
advanced systems ignored the reality of advances being made in other parts of the world. The 
army did, however, make significant strides in the 1930s in the area of internal mechanics. 
Among these developments were air-cooled radial engines, better transmissions, improved 
suspensions and shock absorbers, and more rugged treads. These developments would eventually 
produce reliable and efficient vehicles and would pay large dividends in World War II. After the 
interwar period, the army made use of these components to design a number of vehicles, such as 
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Artillery was in much the same position as the tank. The army still relied on the World 
War I gun known as the “French 75mm.” This gun was not capable of maximum-range fire 
without digging a hole to raise the barrel of the cannon to a 45-degree angle. The gun also had a 
maximum traverse (or swivel) of six degrees, and could not be rapidly transported from one 
place to another without being damaged by the stress of travel. Newer guns were capable of this 
rapid movement, a ninety-degree traverse, and were able to fire at a 45-degree angle without 
digging in. However, like tanks, the technology for artillery had been developed but was not 
widely distributed due to lack of funding.
65
    
Following this trend of creating designs, but not producing them in sufficient numbers, 
the infantry had developed a new rifle, the M1. This rifle was capable of firing three times as fast 
as the Springfield 1903 rifle used in World War I, with significantly less fatigue failure. The M1 
weighed the same at the 1903 Springfield, which, along with the improved firing rate, made it 
more favorable to the infantryman tasked with carrying and firing said rifle. At the end of 
MacArthur‟s term as chief of staff in 1935, however, the army had only allocated funding to 
procure eighty M1 rifles, enough to equip only a large platoon or small company.
66
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MacArthur, in his 1934 chief of staff report, outlined a list of necessary steps to bring the 
army to war readiness, which he considered essential to defend the country. These steps 
consisted of: 
1. Continuous development of military technology in order to have a qualitative edge 
over an opponent. 
2. Purchase of a sufficient amount of new designs in order to develop new tactical and 
strategic doctrines to match new developments. 
3. Replacement of old technology with new as the old wears out, as opposed to 
replacing old parts with old surplus. 
4. Determination of how many of the new models would be required in a war and the 
ability to procure them during peacetime.  
These steps were not met between MacArthur‟s report and the beginning of World War 
II. Because the steps were not met, the army continued to languish in budget deficits and the 
inability to procure proper modern equipment. As a result, much of the army was forced to train 
with World War I equipment. Because they were using old technology, the soldiers were 
constricted to using outdated World War I tactics.
67
 Without producing new weapons, 
mechanized transport, tanks, and field artillery in large amounts, troops were unable to train with 
the new technology to become familiar with how it worked. Just as importantly, officers were 
unable to experiment with the new tactics and strategies the new technologies allowed. 
Experimenting and training with new technology is just as important as designing it.  
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The New Deal greatly changed the atmosphere of funding in all the military branches. In 
an effort to create jobs, the federal government, under President Franklin Roosevelt, allocated 
millions of dollars to each of the military branches for new construction and research. In 1934, 
the army received a $10,000,000 stipend from the Public Works Administration (PWA) for 
vehicle construction and an additional $6,000,000 for ammunition. Using this money, the army 
was able to begin a procurement program, including 150 tanks and combat cars and 3,340 new 
semi-automatic rifles, as well as smaller numbers of field artillery and anti-aircraft guns. The 
army was also given permission to expand to 165,000 men. However, outside of the increased 
number of enlisted men, this was a drop in the bucket in terms of the army‟s total needs, and 
MacArthur objected strongly to the allotment of $238,000,000 to the navy. MacArthur objected 
even more about the air corps, which received $45,000,000 from the PWA independent from the 
rest of the army. MacArthur‟s objections went unheeded; however, because the air corps and 
navy were seen as defensive entities, it was politically easier to grant them money to expand in 
order to create jobs.
68
 Therefore, the army continued to be understaffed, underfunded, and 
underequipped.     
OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT AND OBSOLETE TACTICS 
In 1935, Gen. Malin Craig took over as the army chief of staff. At this time the army 
budget crisis had reached a point so critical that many soldiers were not being equipped with any 
equipment at all, let alone modern equipment. This was partly due to the expansion of the army 
to 165,000 men. New soldiers were coming in at a much faster rate than new materials, leading 
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to a major procurement discrepancy.
69
 In addition to this problem, Congress cut the army‟s 
budget by over $100 million between 1934 and 1935.
70
 Seeing that it was impossible within the 
current financial and political atmosphere to properly equip the army with enough modern 
equipment, Gen. Craig elected to go the opposite direction and implemented his Protective 
Mobilization Plan.
71
 This plan called upon a 400,000-man force to be made up of both Regulars 
and National Guard units, which at least came close to Gen. March‟s 1921 estimate of 500,000 
men to maintain national security, and well above his minimum estimate of 200,000. However, 
most of the 400,000 man force would be National Guard units, which are militia and do not have 
the same level of training as regular soldiers.  
To get the money to raise this size force, Gen. Craig froze all research projects and 
reduced the amount of army money going to research to .8% of the total army budget, down 
from approximately 5.6% during the previous decade. This led to soldiers being issued 
equipment that was obsolete before it was built. New tanks, guns, and rifles never entered 
production in significant numbers, but the plan at least gave each soldier a rifle.
72
 Gen. Craig was 
also not a major proponent of tank warfare. After observing the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) 
and the Sino-Japanese War (officially 1937-1945, but with border skirmishes beginning in 1931), 
he concluded that tanks would remain, as they had been in World War I, infantry support 
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 In addition, he believed that the wars proved that defense had regained the ground 
lost to tanks at the end of World War I, and that a defensive mindset and strong infantry were the 
keys to winning a war. This defensive, infantry-centric mindset led to the United States falling 
even further behind other world powers in terms of tank development.
74
 
When Gen. George Marshall took over as chief of staff in 1939, he inherited an army in 
shambles. The regular army contained only 174,000 enlisted men scattered over 130 different 
bases. The army had no men to commit to a field army should the need arise, with nearly all of 
these 174,000 men committed to essential non-combat duties, or garrison duty in the Philippines. 
The available budget for training amounted to less than five percent of the total army budget, 
which Marshall described as “that of a third-rate power.”
75
 The army had been restricted to a 
two-week training cycle every four years, of which only five days contained actual maneuvers 
due to a lack of motor transport. This was unacceptable to Marshall, and he sought to change the 
army structure once again.
76
  
Even as late as 1939, when World War II had already begun in Europe, Marshall still 
received resistance from department heads against modernization. Both Gen. Robert Danford 
and Gen. John Herr, chiefs of the artillery and cavalry respectively, were proponents of animal 
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power over mechanized power through their removal in 1942.
77
 In February 1939, Marshall, as 
deputy chief of staff, had written to Congress about the most critical aspects of the army‟s needs: 
replacing the 36-year-old Springfield rifle design with the M1 as the standard-issue rifle, modern 
artillery, manufacturing and distribution of anti-air and antitank munitions to army units, 
manufacturing ammunition reserves, and that Congress deem these matters as necessary for 
National Defense, rather than further cutting an already shoestring budget.
78
 Fortunately for 
Marshall, after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Congress raised the army‟s budget by just 
under $200 million, to $513,188,782, independent of air corps allowances.  
At the end of the interwar period, the army was in much the same position that it had 
been in at the beginning. It was under-funded, under-strength, and under-trained. Most of its 
units were still using outdated equipment from the First World War. Mechanization still needed 
further development. The size of the army was still tens of thousands of men short of what the 
chiefs of staff believed to be the minimum troop level to defend the country. The budget, while 
slightly larger than it had been prior to World War I, was not enough to overcome the bureau 
system‟s inefficiency and additional need to develop mechanization and motorization. In 
addition, the budget problem only got worse during the mid-1930s, just as war began to appear 
on the horizon. This dire situation severely affected the United States‟ ability to involve itself in 
any armed conflict, especially a potential two-front war. 
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The failures of the army to modernize cannot be laid at the feet of one institution or 
event. The isolationist and defensive policies adopted in the early 1920s, especially the National 
Defense Act of 1921, cut both the army‟s manpower and funding to the bone. In addition, the 
marginalization of the position of chief of staff and the resurgence of the bureau system hindered 
a cohesive effort towards modernization. Despite the support of mechanization by each of the 
chiefs of staff, many of the bureau heads disagreed up until the beginning of World War II, 
including the heads of both the artillery and cavalry departments as late as 1942. Despite this 
resistance, in addition to a lack of funding, the army was still able to make progress, designing 
modern and innovative components for tanks. These tanks, however, were also armed with 
under-strength and obsolete weaponry. Although the army had designed the M1 rifle, fewer than 
5,000 were made, and most of the army still used the 1903 Springfield rifle as a primary weapon. 
The artillery department still relied on an antiquated design and cancelled its mechanized 
artillery program completely. In addition, funding problems did not allow the army to produce 
any new designs in significant numbers. This, coupled with the lack of funding for large-scale 
training maneuvers, meant the army did not know how to make use of what little new equipment 
it did have. In all, the interwar period can be considered an utter failure for the army. Fortunately 
for the United States and its international military standing, other branches of the military did not 
flounder as severely.   
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AIR CORPS: FROM FABRIC TO FORTRESSES 
 The years between 1918 and 1926 were very difficult for the air service. The budget cuts 
enacted by the National Defense Act of 1920 affected the air service even worse than the rest of 
the army, and it rapidly found itself running out of both aircraft and men to fly them as the planes 
crashed or broke down and pilots were killed or left the service. The government cancelled over 
$100 million worth of production contracts for the air corps as soon as the war ended, and the 
aircraft industry as a whole shrank to ten percent of its wartime size.
79
 The air service was cut to 
9,000 men, down from nearly 200,000 officers and enlisted men at the end of World War I, and 
could not produce any new aircraft. In 1924, the air service only had 800 active aircraft, and 
many of these were obsolete DH-4s, which the British had begun replacing in 1914 for being 
slow, underpowered and unreliable.
80
  
In 1921, Gen. Pershing became the army chief of staff, and reorganized the air service 
among the commanders of ground forces, making the chief of the air service a glorified 
quartermaster with little in the way of actual authority.
81
 However, unlike the rest of the army, 
army aviation succeeded in unifying its command structure and finding a role to fulfill in a 
peacetime military. This, along with a mutually beneficial relationship with civilian aviation, 
allowed the air corps to transform over the course of twenty years from a small, obsolete 
reconnaissance auxiliary to a largely independent force of cutting-edge bombers. 
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THE ERA OF BILLY MITCHELL 
 Despite its troubles in the early 1920s, the air service was not without its proponents. One 
of the most outspoken proponents of the air service and air power during this period was the 
deputy director of the air service, Gen. William “Billy” Mitchell. Mitchell had been in the army 
since 1898 and had made several tours of the Pacific Rim, analyzing the defensibility of 
America‟s Pacific holdings and observing the Russo-Japanese War. In 1916, he transferred to the 
aviation section of the signal corps, which was the forerunner to the air service. In 1917, he was 
sent to Europe as an aviation observer and spent the course of the World War I observing 
military aircraft in France.
82
  
 Mitchell returned from the war with the realization that aircraft could become an essential 
element to a modern military force. He was determined to form an independent air force in the 
United States, on par with the army and navy in terms of importance within the military.
83
 He 
saw that the new isolationist policies being enacted by the government would lead to a focus on 
defensive strategies over offensive, so he steered his tactics in that direction, specifically towards 
coastal defense.
84
  This, incidentally, would lead to thirty years of competition between the navy 
and the air service over the question of who would be in charge of coastal defense.
85
 Mitchell 
had some success, but his plan for an independent air force hit a solid wall of resistance with 
both the heads of the army and the navy. Pershing insisted that the air service should remain an 
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army auxiliary, while the navy had had its own air program for years and had no intention of 
giving it up, as naval aviation needed to focus on different goals.
86
  
Because he was unable to gain support for an independent air force in Congress due to 
opposition from the army and navy, Mitchell turned to the public forum. He actively campaigned 
against the navy in the press, claiming that the battleship was obsolete and could be easily sunk 
by aircraft, which cost a fraction of what a battleship cost.
87
 In fact, Mitchell believed that the 
navy was largely obsolete as a whole and that nearly all their missions could be performed and 
exceeded by aircraft. He estimated that the cost of a naval battle group, consisting of a battleship 
and its escorts, well exceeded $100,000,000. For this cost, he claimed an air force could build 
4,000 aircraft, far more than would be needed to sink that battle group. At the time, the fleet 
contained 18 battleships, each of which needed its own escorts; consequently, Mitchell estimated 
that 72,000 aircraft could have been built for the same price.
88
 Mitchell argued that an air force 
of that size would be able to defend the coast and control sea communications by locating and 
attacking any enemy navy long before their battleship‟s guns could reach the coast. By early 
1921, his public attacks on the navy had gained enough public support for Congress to force the 
navy to allow a test of Mitchell‟s theories, especially his claim to be able to sink a battleship with 
only a small number of aircraft.
89
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On July 21, 1921, Mitchell‟s aircraft concluded a demonstration of their potential by 
successfully sinking an old German battleship, the Ostfriesland, although they violated many of 
the test parameters to do it, including altitude limits, bomb size, and attack patterns.
90
 The navy 
protested that because of these violations the test was not conclusive. Nevertheless, the battleship 
was at the bottom of the harbor, and that was all that mattered in public opinion. Mitchell was 
openly contemptuous of the navy in his report on the test, mocking the sailors‟ panicked 
responses to debris from bomb detonations landing on their ships‟ decks. Ironically, despite his 
success in sinking all the targets in dramatic fashion, the test ended up being a set-back for 
Mitchell‟s plan for an independent air force, because it solidified the navy against Mitchell 
personally and induced it to pursue its own aviation techniques.
91
  
In 1923, Mitchell continued his campaign to convince the military and government of the 
need for an independent air force. Using eighteen bombers, he provided a small-scale 
demonstration showing that an air force, using concentrated bases, could be used to defend any 
point in America, especially the sparsely populated center.
92
 This defense would require a 
concentration of force that was in conflict with Gen. Pershing‟s strategy of even distribution of 
aircraft amongst the army‟s ground units. It was Mitchell‟s opinion that small amounts of aircraft 
stationed with ground forces would not be able to project a unified force against an enemy, 
diminishing their offensive capabilities and allowing them to be defeated in detail.
93
 Toward the 
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end of 1923, Mitchell departed on a grand Pacific tour to once again inspect the military‟s 
positions and relative strength. He concluded that war with Japan was likely and edging toward 
inevitable. However, he also concluded that the United States was no longer the dominant power 
in the region, losing that claim to the Japanese. Mitchell spent the next year contributing to the 
tactical and doctrinal growth of the air service. He wrote a manual for air bombardment and a 
comprehensive Pacific air strategy to combat the Japanese. These two works were nearly a 




In 1925, a confluence of events occurred that ended Mitchell‟s career. First, the military 
and government ignored his plan for the Pacific theater. Second, the government decreed that the 
army and navy would continue to maintain control over their own aviation and aviation strategy, 
and that it would not create an overarching Department of Defense to oversee the army, navy and 
Mitchell‟s proposed air force. Mitchell was so frustrated by these decisions that when the navy 
dirigible Shenandoah crashed on September 3, 1925, killing 17 men, he lashed out against the 
government, accusing them of “incompetency, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable 
administration of National Defense.”
95
 This gave President Coolidge, who already wanted 
Mitchell out of the army, the ammunition he needed to court-martial Mitchell.  
By this time, Mitchell had made enemies of President Coolidge and Secretary of War 
Dwight Davis for his criticism of their handling of America‟s air services. In addition to these 
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power players, Mitchell‟s embarrassment of the navy and subsequent attempt to annex the navy‟s 
air service caused the naval air chief, Adm. William Moffett to remark, “I wish he were in 
hell.”
96
 The majority of Congress, the media, and the general populace supported Mitchell (there 
were actually demonstrations of support for him when a rumor was circulated that he would be 
hanged for treason); the army was split, but mostly wanted the whole issue to go away. But the 
Executive Branch hated Mitchell from Coolidge on down.
97
 Coolidge took over the investigation 
personally, and stacked the jury against Mitchell.
98
 He was convicted of breaking discipline and 
sentenced to be suspended from the army for five years. Mitchell resigned from the army on 
February 1,
 




THE NACA AND THE FORMATION OF THE AIR CORPS 
Although Billy Mitchell was one of the most vocal proponents for the importance of air 
power, he was not the only individual or organization working toward the technological 
advancement of the airplane. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), 
founded in 1915, was established by the United States government to effectively coordinate 
aeronautical research. Following the post-World War collapse of the air industry, the NACA 
dramatically reorganized itself to suit the new budget reality. It adopted four principles to govern 
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its existence: 1, that the military services would be responsible for all training and personnel 
policies within their branch, as well as the engineering development of aircraft for their branch; 
2, that the Post Office would be in charge of its own aviation; 3, that the NACA would retain its 
duty to advise and organize aviation research; and 4, that an Air Navigation Board would be 
established within the Department of Commerce. The last principle created an official 
department to regulate and encourage civilian aviation, controlled military air power at the 
government level, and provided a joint board for the leaders of various air departments to 
meet.
100
   
Continuing to trim the bureaucratic fat, in 1919, the NACA abolished sixteen of its 
eighteen existing research subcommittees and replaced them with four new “technical” 
committees, three of which would account for eighty-eight percent of the reports published by 
the NACA over the remainder of its existence.
 101
 During this period, the NACA became less 
strictly “advisory” and became more involved with the research itself. The research goals of the 
NACA were fairly conservative in nature; they did not strive for great leaps forward, but rather 
for gradual progress based on engineering rather than science.
102
  This means that building 
models and physically testing them became more important than theory. 
The NACA‟s process for accepting and researching a problem was fairly straightforward. 
The appropriate NACA committee would receive a suggestion for research from either NACA 
staff or an outside source, typically a government agency or the military. All military requests 
                                                          
100
 Roland, Model Research, 52-55. 
101
 Ibid, 74-75. 
102
 Ibid, 96. 
44 
 
were automatically accepted, and all others were examined to see if they added fundamental 
knowledge to the field of aeronautics. If they were approved, they were given research 
authorization and forwarded to the NACA research lab in Langley, Virginia. This system 
allowed for research to be reviewed from the beginning and periodically thereafter and greatly 
increased research efficiency. One of the most successful developments to come out of the 
NACA was a new engine cowling for aircraft engines that was developed within months of the 
initial request. This led to the NACA winning its first Collier Trophy, an annual award for the 
greatest achievement in aeronautics.
103
  
The early 1920s also saw the emergence of metal aircraft and a decline of new wooden 
designs. Initially, the shift from wood to metal was primarily a marketing decision, not a material 
one. Metal at the time had no inherent superiority as an aircraft building material. It was much 
heavier, especially in the wing area. It was more expensive than wood, and wood actually had a 
stronger tensile strength than metal.
104
 However, the public ideology of progress through 
technology made metal a more popular choice as a building material. Wood was seen as an 
impermanent, imprecise, and unreliable pre-industrial material, while metal was seen as a 
permanent, efficient, and fire safe post-industrial material. Despite evidence discounting this 
perception and the fact that airplane fuel and not the wooden design was the main danger, metal 
designs rapidly won support from the military and the NACA. This shift from wood designs to 
metal also denoted a shift in engineering from an art to more of a science. The metal designs 
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encouraged research, and metals had more overall potential than wood, despite the fact that 
wooden designs could outperform metal designs at the time. Metal designs also lent themselves 
to mass-production techniques, whereas wood designs had to be built largely by hand by skilled 
workers.
105
 In addition, the army feared that wood could not be produced in sufficient quantity 
during wartime to build the number of planes they would need. Without any real data to support 
it, they assumed that metal could be produced in sufficient quantity.
106
  
Nearly a decade passed before any usable metal prototypes were developed for the air 
service. Weight, performance, and cost were all significant problems for metal designs, which 
led the air service to delay producing all-metal aircraft, although they still supported an all-metal 
ideology. There was some success with metal wing spars due to metal‟s higher compressive 
strength, but the air service would not produce any functional all-metal designs until the mid-
1930s, made possible by a number of congressional acts designed to strengthened the aeronautics 
industry.  
Between 1923 and 1926 a series of several congressional boards and acts dramatically 
changed the course of both military and civilian aircraft in the United States. In 1923, in response 
to Mitchell‟s bombing tests, the Lassiter Board was convened to review the state of the air 
service and the civilian air industry. The air industry had lost millions of dollars in construction 
contracts when World War I ended, and civilian buyers could buy wartime surplus aircraft rather 
than purchase new planes from manufactures. What the Lassiter Board found was not inspiring. 
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The Board reported on personnel shortfalls and aircraft deterioration. In addition, they found that 
the lack of military contracts was causing a significant hardship for the civilian air industry. In 
1924, the Board actually suggested the formation of an independent air force, or at least a 
General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Corps, which would give the air corps a level of autonomy 
within the army similar to what the Marines had within the navy. They also wrote that this air 
corps (or air force) should be capable of both bombing and anti-air missions.
107
 The Morrow 
Board was convened soon afterward, and was much more influential though much more 
conservative, but it agreed with the Lassiter Board that the aircraft industry and the air service 
were in disrepair and needed to be strengthened.
108
 
The civilian air sector reeled in the aftermath of World War I. Cancelled contracts and 
war surplus materials nearly dealt a death blow to the fledgling industry. This hurt military 
aircraft design as well, as military aviation had always relied on civilian air industry for both 
research and construction. By the mid-1920s, the industry was in danger of total collapse. In 
February 1925, civilian aviation got its first governmental boost with the passing of the Kelly 
Act. This act allowed the US Postal Service to contract out its air mail to private corporations, 
rather than being restricted to government aircraft. This allowed private corporations to begin 
building, selling, and buying new aircraft and new aircraft designs in order to gain government 
contracts. In addition, the Kelly Act inadvertently helped to bring about the creation of air travel 
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for civilians, as the mail rarely filled the aircrafts‟ cargo capacity and the remaining space was 
often given over to a few passengers.
109
  
To continue its aid to civilian aviation, Congress passed the Air Commerce Act in 1926, 
which would permanently link civilian aircraft firms and military aircraft. This act approved new 
manufacturing contracts for civilian companies to design and build aircraft for the military. It 
ultimately led to a philosophy that military contracts were the best way to receive funding for 
research and development. This act, along with the Kelly Act, greatly increased the health of 
civilian aviation, which in turn proved very important to military aviation in the coming years, as 
civilian aviation became a hotbed of technical innovation. Several transport planes were 




The Air Corps Act was also passed in 1926. This act officially created the army air corps, 
moving army aviation out from under the Signal Corps. This made sense from an organizational 
standpoint because the Signal Corps was responsible for army communications and 
reconnaissance, not combat. The creation of a separate corps for aviation gave army airmen a 
level of autonomy from the rest of the army and allowed them to pursue their own goals and 
methods. The act also increased the number of officers in the air corps from 900 to 1,514, 
increased enlisted men from 9,760 to 16,000 and mandated that the air corps must have 1,800 
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functioning aircraft at all times. The air corps chief of staff also reported directly to its own 
Assistant Secretary of War.
111
  
Maj. Gen. Mason Patrick, who had been chief of the air service since 1921, was made 
chief of the air corps and did a great deal to create a culture separate from the army within the 
corps. The air corps became an extremely closed society. Having grown weary of bringing in 
senior officers from other divisions during his time in the air section and air service, Patrick 
made more of an effort to promote from within. He mandated that ninety percent of each officer 
grade within the corps must be certified pilots. Finally, with the founding of the air corps coming 
closely on the heels of what was considered by many air corps officers to be Gen. Mitchell‟s 
“martyrdom,” the internal culture of the air corps became one heavily in favor of complete 




FINDING A PURPOSE 
 After gaining partial independence from the army, the new air corps focused on carving 
out a strategic niche for itself. The goal was to develop a role for the air corps that could not be 
replicated by another branch of the military in order to gain funding. This niche became strategic 
bombing. During World War I, the goal of the air service had been to support the infantry by 
strafing trenches and providing reconnaissance. The air corps wanted to depart from this role, 
and thus began to develop long-range bombers designed to attack enemies far behind the front 
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lines in order to target cities and economic infrastructure rather than pure military targets. The air 
corps classified long-range bombers as defensive weapons, although they were clearly 
offensive.
113
 They were able to justify this because of the air corps‟ other focus, coastal defense. 
The air corps justified these long-range bombers as being able to attack incoming ships, even if 
they were also intended to attack cities.
114
 
The late 1920s heralded a minor revolution in the American aircraft industry, both for 
civilian and military aviation. Between 1928 and 1929, the total number of civilian air 
passengers surged by 335 percent and doubled again between 1929 and 1930. Between 1927 and 
1933, the amount of miles flown by non-airmail aircraft increased from 638,000 miles to 
10,860,000 miles.
115
 This is an example of “Increasing Returns to Adoption,” a technological 
concept which states that the more people who adopt a technology, the better and cheaper the 
technology gets. Commercial aircraft, not burdened by limited federal funding and isolationist 
policies (as the military was), actually leapt ahead of the military in the late 1920s into the early 
1930s. In fact, by 1933, private airplane manufacturers had developed the basic commercial 
design that would last into the 1970s.
116
  
 During this period, the air corps relied nearly entirely on private contractors for new 
designs, doing virtually no internal research.
117
 Most of the planes built in the late 1920s were 
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old-style wood-and-cloth observation planes, and were still using Liberty engines built during 
World War I. These engines were “unreliable, inefficient, and uneconomical” and could not be 
used in newer, heavier aircraft.
118
 In 1929, the air corps decided to promote all-metal designs 
exclusively rather than wood or wood-metal hybrid designs. Funding problems caused by trying 
to fund new aircraft while simultaneously expanding using existing designs kept the air corps 
from reaching this goal right away, but it did purchase two all-metal designs in the early 1930s: 
the Boeing YB-9 bomber, and the P-26 pursuit plane.
119
  
The YB-9 was an example of civilian designs spilling over into military aviation. It was 
the first all-metal bomber ever purchased by the air corps.
120
 The two-engine YB-9 was based 
heavily on the Boeing Model 200 Monomail single-engine cargo plane. The Monomail was, in 
turn, based upon the reports put out by the army and air corps regarding stressed-skinned wing 
design, internally braced wings, and Warren-truss rib design.
121
 The only major differences 
between the Monomail and the YB-9 were the addition of a second engine, a change of engine 
location, and the purpose of the aircraft.
122
 Only a few YB-9s were ever actually produced for the 
military, and the Boeing design eventually lost military bids to the Martin B-10. The B-10 was 
originally designed with a metal frame and cloth-covered wings, but entered production with 
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metal wings similar to that of the YB-9. The redesigned B-10 was slightly faster and had a higher 
lift-to-weight ratio, meaning it was able to carry heavier loads given its size. The B-10 was the 
first bomber with enough range and payload capacity produced in sufficient numbers (103 were 
ordered) to really make the goal of strategic bombing possible.
123
  
Despite their bomber design not being purchased in large numbers, Boeing did win the 
contract to develop the P-26 in 1931 largely due to the initial success of the YB-9. The P-26 was 
the first all-metal single-wing airplane to be built in the same price range of a wooden biplane 
designed to play the same role. The P-26 performed significantly better than its wooden biplane 
predecessor, the Boeing P-12C. In addition, the P-26 actually cost less to build than the P-12C 
when it went into production in 1933; when the deflation caused by the Depression is factored in, 
the P-26 cost slightly more in materials, but still less in construction.
124
  
THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND GROWING AUTONOMY 
The Great Depression did not affect the air corps as much as it did the rest of the country 
or the other branches of the military. As seen above, many of the major advances in metal 
designs occurred during the first few years of the Great Depression, between 1929 and 1933. In 
1931, Trubee Davison, the Assistant Secretary of War in charge of the air corps, reported that in 
terms of aircraft strength, the United States ranked fourth in the world including naval aircraft, 
and ranked fifth without them. He found this unacceptable and called for a substantial expansion 
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of the air corps.
125
 In 1933, chief of staff MacArthur rejected a proposal to greatly expand the air 
corps beyond budgetary possibility, but did direct the deputy chief of staff, Gen. Hugh Drum, to 
convene a committee to review the air corps‟ expansion plans. The Drum Board also rejected the 
proposal, but did suggest the formulation of a General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Corps which 
would, if created, grant army aviation even more independence, similar to that of the marines in 
the navy. It would also allow the air corps to train and develop tactics independent of the army. 
The Drum Board was the first committee to suggest the creation of a GHQ for the air corps since 
the Lassiter Board in 1923.
126
 The Drum Board also suggested a more realistic but substantial 
increase in the number of aircraft. However, these suggestions were not immediately acted upon 
due to the army‟s budget crisis.
127
  
In 1934, the air corps and navy once again made a push for sole control of coastal 
defense. This led to a prolonged battle between Gen. MacArthur and the new navy chief of 
operations, Adm. William Standley. After months of talks and government intervention, they 
reached a compromise that was purposely vague and let both branches continue to claim 
responsibility over coastal defense.
128
 The outcome of this ambiguous settlement was that the 
army had no choice but to grant the air corps more autonomy.  It allowed the creation of a 
peacetime GHQ Air Corps in order to organize, deploy, and train the air corps as if war could 
begin at any moment, since it would be its responsibility (in the army‟s eyes, if not the navy‟s) to 
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defend against a surprise attack upon the coastline. This also led to the long overdue cancellation 
of the Pershing-designed 9-element strike forces under the command of ground commanders. 
Instead, the GHQ Air Corps put the entirety of the air corps under the singular command of the 
chief of the air corps, second only to the army chief of staff.
129
  
Before the GHQ could be organized, a crisis greatly stressed the air corps and hastened 
its formation. In early 1934, President Roosevelt cancelled the air mail contracts between the 
Post Office and the independent contractors licensed to deliver the mail, thanks to a Senate 
committee‟s findings of collusion and fraud on the part of the contractors. Roosevelt asked air 
corps chief of staff Benjamin Foulois if the air corps could temporarily handle the load. Foulois 
agreed without considering the implications of the task. It turned out to be an unmitigated 
disaster. Air corps pilots were not used to flying through harsh weather or at night; delivering the 
air mail required both of these things. Instruments such as artificial horizons, gyro compasses, 
and radios, although developed, were not in sufficient supply, so many of the pilots had to do 
without. In the twelve months the air corps handled the mail, there were twelve deaths, sixty-six 
crashes, and only a sixty-six percent completed delivery rate. Each of these deaths and crashes 
was also highly publicized, creating a perception that the air corps was incompetent.
130
 
The disaster of the air mail project did result in some good. The use of instruments and 
instrumental flying became standard practice within the air corps. The use of radio 
communications while flying also proved to be important, and the air corps created a national air 
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communication system, which would be officially established as the Army Airways 
Communication System in 1938. Also, the negative press of the disastrous airmail project was 
mitigated somewhat by the public, who could not believe that the air corps could have failed so 
miserably on its own; they called for the government to improve its funding and training.
131
 
The government‟s response was to convene the 1935 Baker Board under Newton Baker, 
former Secretary of War. The Baker Board suggested much the same things as the earlier Drum 
Board, and expanded the air corps to 2,320 aircraft and 16,650 men. It also expedited the 
formation of the GHQ Air Corps, which, while approved, had not yet completed organizing. The 
Baker Report reiterated that a civilian aviation industry was “absolutely essential to the national 
defense.”
132
 This was not only for research purposes, but also because “military aviation in time 
of war must rely upon airplanes built in time of war and consequently the general condition and 
productive capacity of the aircraft industry are of national concern.”
133
 That same year the air 
corps received $45,000,000 from the Public Works Authority for new construction and 
research.
134
 The air corps also received over $48 million independent of the army and an 
additional $22 million solely for aircraft purchase. It should be noted this was the same year that 
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the army‟s budget was cut by $100 million.
135
 This clearly shows the government‟s commitment 
to military aviation. 
The leadership of the air corps, after failing to gain complete independence despite 
support from both the Drum and Baker Boards, realized that the GHQ Air Corps was the closest 
it could reasonably come to independence for the time being. The GHQ Air Corps was officially 
activated in March 1935, ending the push for an air force until after World War II.
136
  
THE RISE OF CIVILIAN AVIATION FIRMS 
The NACA did not enjoy the same success as the air corps during the Depression years. 
In the wake of the stock market crash, it was accused, but never convicted, of corruption and 
profiteering. As a result of these accusations, the agency reorganized, focusing more on internal 
research rather than their initial advisory role. It combined some redundant research 
subcommittees in order to conserve funds and improve its public image. Despite its efforts, the 
NACA received no congressional funding from 1931-1937, although funds appropriated by the 
New Deal‟s Public Works funds would alleviate some of this budget shortfall.
137
  
The NACA was called upon to justify its existence constantly throughout the 1930s. 
Because the NACA had moved away from advising and organizing and had focused on research, 
it seemed to be redundant when compared to the plethora of both civilian and governmental 
research firms and agencies focused on the advancement of air power. The NACA denied that it 
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had deviated from its purpose to advise and organize research; it responded by saying that, unlike 
civilian firms or individual military services, the NACA provided a forum for other research 
groups to discuss what they were doing, and therefore it actually prevented duplication of 
research. However, this distinction was often overlooked by congressmen and citizens, and in the 
public mind, the seeds of doubt had been sown. By the end of the 1930s, the NACA had lost its 
claim to being the being the best avionics research lab in the world. Domestic firms had taken the 
lead, as had other European firms. Despite the growing crisis in Europe, the NACA could not 
consistently overcome its enemies in Congress and by the end of the interwar period, the NACA 
had lost much of its relevancy as an avionics research organization.
138
 
Civilian industry and academia took over much of the research from the flagging NACA. 
Much of the growth in these two sectors can be attributed to Daniel Guggenheim, a wealthy 
industrialist and philanthropist. Between 1926 and 1930, Guggenheim donated over two million 
dollars to various universities in order to establish and expand aeronautical engineering 
schools.
139
 In 1926, Guggenheim founded the Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of 
Aeronautics. This fund was an outgrowth of his already sizable contributions to New York 
University and focused on building aerospace programs in all areas of the country. The first 
universities selected were from the West and Midwest: the California Institution of Technology, 
Stanford University, and the University of Michigan. These universities already had small 
aeronautical schools with influential aircraft engineers. Guggenheim donated between $300,000 
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and $500,000 to each school to greatly expand their programs.
140
 Having donated money to 
universities on the West coast (Stanford and Cal Tech), the Midwest (Michigan) and New York 
(NYU), Guggenheim donated money to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in December 
of 1926 and the University of Washington in 1928 in order to establish aeronautical schools in 
New England and the Pacific Northwest respectively.
141
 The final school to be selected was the 
Georgia School of Technology (later the Georgia Institute of Technology) in 1930. Georgia Tech 
was the only school without an established aeronautical school, but its location and state funding 
made it the best choice for a Southern Guggenheim school.
142
 In just over four years, Daniel 
Guggenheim had altered the landscape of aeronautics in academia. In 1926, there were only 96 
aeronautical engineering students in the country, most of them enrolled at the first four 
Guggenheim schools. In 1930, when the fund expired, there were hundreds of students scattered 
across the country. In addition, the funds provided helped to build wind-tunnels at each of these 
schools, an essential piece of equipment for an aeronautics lab.
143
 These schools remain some of 
the best aeronautical schools in the country; the top six aerospace engineering graduate schools 
in the country began as part of the Guggenheim Fund.
144
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In addition to his contributions through the Guggenheim Fund, Daniel Guggenheim also 
made contributions to public grade schools to start aeronautical classes.
145
 He gave grants to 
graduate students to travel abroad and to conduct independent research.
146
He gave numerous 
grants to fund the development of more accurate flying instruments. These instruments allowed 
pilots to “blind fly,” meaning flying only using instruments in bad weather or at night.
147
 Finally, 
he founded the “Safe Aircraft Competition.”
148
 Most airplane crashes at the time were caused by 
engines stalling at slow speeds and at low altitudes, which meant they usually stalled while 
trying to land. The Safe Aircraft Competition awarded $100,000 to the first aircraft designer to 
build an aircraft meeting the following specifications: the plane must land at less than 30mph on 
a less than 100-foot runway and must fly level at 35mph. In addition, the aircraft must reach a 
top speed of at least 110mph, climb at 400 feet-per-second, and have enough inherent stability to 
allow the pilot to take his hands off the controls for a full five minutes while travelling between 
45mph and 100mph. Finally, extra points were given to any contestant who could outperform 
these specifications.
149
 The results of this competition led to a revolution in landing safety by 
producing more stable avionics and technology that allowed aircraft to fly at slower speeds. An 
unexpected additional result was that the same technology that made landing safer also 
drastically shortened the distance an aircraft needed to take off. This would eventually lead to a 
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type of wartime aircraft known at the Short-Takeoff-and-Landing (or STOL) aircraft. The ability 
to use very short runways made these aircraft useful in island landings and on city streets.
150
 
Advances made by Guggenheim school graduates led to several major advances in long-
range strategic bombing in the 1930s. In 1934, following the success of the YB-9 and B-10, the 
air corps set a contract reward for “Project A,” a proposed bomber that would carry 2,000 pounds 
of bombs 5,000 miles at 200 mph.
151
 The contract was awarded to Boeing later that year. Project 
A was designed as a long-term experimental design and was not meant to be a design-and-buy 
project.
152
 While the first product of Project A, the XB-15 (X for experimental), was an 
operational failure (it could only fly 145 miles per hour fully loaded and barely travelled at 200 
mph empty) it did contain a number of highly advanced systems. These systems included an 
autopilot, deicing installations (essential for a high-altitude bomber), fire-fighting equipment, 
electric generators, and passages within the wings that allowed for engine maintenance during 
flight.
153
 In addition, because of the length of the flights it was designed to achieve, the XB-15 
contained sleeping, toilet, and cooking facilities, as well as space for an onboard flight engineer. 
It could also carry 8,000 pounds of bombs--four times the amount of payload Project A required. 
Although the XB-15 was a technical “failure” in that it did not get built in large numbers, the 
plane did serve as a Red Cross cargo plane, and gave Boeing the experience needed to create a 
much more successful design: the B-17.
154
 Project A was finally cancelled in 1945 and was a 
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valuable experiment in terms of technological development, contributing heavily to the design of 
heavy bombers. In addition, the long-term project did much to cement the relationship between 
the air corps and civilian designers.  
The bomber project that would lead to the B-17 actually began about the same time as 
Project A, and was designed to replace the B-10. The air corps did some fast talking to convince 
Congress to fund both Project A and another long-range bomber design simultaneously, but 
disguised the similarity by pitching Project A as a design for a bomber with long range, and 
phrasing the other project as a bomber with better speed and efficiency. Realistically, both of 
these amounted to a fast long-range bomber, but the B-10 replacement needed to be built as soon 
as possible, while Project A was a long-term project not designed to produce quick results. The 
distinction between range and efficiency was enough to gain funding for both projects. Boeing‟s 
experience with Project A gave it the advantage on the project by allowing them an inside look at 
what the air corps actually wanted, aside from the vague official description, which boiled down 
to “like the B-10, but better.”
155
  
The resulting XB-17 was a paragon of engineering when it entered the design phase and 
the interwar highpoint of the air corps drive to develop strategic bombing. It was streamlined, 
with all external systems either removed or integrated into the hull. All its weapons systems were 
enclosed, including machine guns and bomb racks. The plane also had retractable landing gear. 
The main body and wings were designed to distribute weight and stress evenly across the length 
of the plane, rather than on reinforced stress points. Redundant electric generators used to power 
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major systems, such as landing gear, bomb bay doors, and flaps, were spaced widely throughout 
the plane‟s fuselage and wings.
156
 These design points made the B-17 extremely survivable in 
combat because it could take massive damage without tearing itself apart due to structural 
damage or losing systems due to power failure.
157
 Numerous stories came out of World War II 
about B-17s remaining aloft and landing safely after sustaining major damage to the wings, 




Although the reports coming out of Boeing headquarters convinced several air corps 
officers that the B-17 was the winner before it was ever built, other aviation companies were not 
willing to concede the contract. The Martin Company submitted a design that was essentially an 
improved B-10, with upgraded landing gear, autopilot, flaps, and radio equipment. Douglas also 
submitted a “bomberized” version of its DC-2 cargo plane, named the B-18 “Bolo.”
159
   
The B-17 was the clear favorite among the air corps‟ airmen due to its longer range and 
heavier payload, but it did have one major flaw: its cost. The B-17 was a giant aircraft for its 
time, and cost twice as much as the smaller B-18. The War Department and army chief of staff 
Craig were committed to providing the air corps with a certain amount of bombers, but felt they 
could fulfill that pledge for half the cost if they purchased the less-popular B-18. This also 
coincided with the government‟s isolationist policies; the range and payload capacity of the B-17 
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made it hard to fit into the official policy of “bombers for coastal defense” as it was clearly an 
offensive plane. With a range of over 2,000 miles, a B-17 could strike targets halfway across the 
Atlantic, which at the time was too far away to hit a moving target. In addition, B-17s optimal 
flight altitude was 7,000 feet, too high for an accurate strike against something as small as a 
battleship for aircraft carrier. When one of the XB-17 prototypes crashed due to pilot error in 
1935, it gave the War Department the excuse it needed to buy 350 B-18 Bolos, and only thirteen 
B-17s. Airmen disliked the B-18, describing it as having a “strong affection for the ground.”
160
 
The B-18 had a short and uneventful career and, with the growing threat of war, was being 




The rapid progress made in strategic bombers in the mid-to-late 1930s did not carry over 
to the fighter planes or pursuit aircraft. The P-26 was only slightly faster than the bombers it was 
designed to escort or attack, and was unable to intercept “attacking” bombers in a number of 
exercises. Several air corps officers, most notably Brig. Gen. Oscar Westover, assistant chief of 
the air corps, suggested removing pursuit aircraft from the air corps completely due to lack of 
performance. He also believed that they were not needed for escort duty, stating that bombers 
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Pursuit fighters did have some support, especially from Capt. Claire Chennault. He stated 
that the P-26‟s inability to intercept its target bombers was caused more by the airplane‟s age in 
relation to its targets rather than the inherent invulnerability of the bombers, which was the air 
corps‟ official position. He also believed that the failure of the P-26 should inspire the air corps 
to improve their fighter aircraft rather than assuming that bombers could provide their own 
defense, and pointed to new foreign fighters as proof of the fighter aircraft‟s potential. Chennault 
was considered largely an annoyance to the air corps commanders and although he did influence 
the younger generation of fighter pilots, his beliefs would not become doctrine until World War 
II began and the vulnerability of the bomber squadron was proved.
163
 At the end of the interwar 
period, the air corps had three planes in development to replace the P-26, but all of them were 
obsolete compared to their Japanese and German competition. The P-36 and P-40 were fast at 
low-altitude, but lacked the power for high-altitude flight necessary to attack bombers. The P-38 
had the power necessary to go head-to-head with the Japanese and Germans, and was one of the 




In late 1938, President Roosevelt called a meeting that resulted in legislation that would 
be known as the air corps‟ “Magna Carta.” In this meeting, he called for the expansion of the air 
corps from 2,300 planes to 10,000, with the ability to purchase another 10,000 every year. 
Roosevelt‟s goal was to be able to put teeth behind any letters he sent to foreign governments, 
and because building an army was politically impossible due to the perception of the army as a 
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solely offensive force, he would build an air force instead.
165
 In March of 1939, Congress 
approved a budget of $358 million dollars for the air corps alone, a total larger than the army‟s 
budget the previous year.
166
 
Military air power in America underwent an amazing transformation during the interwar 
period, going from a small collection of wood-and-fabric scouts to a fighting force of over 2000 
all-metal aircraft capable of striking at an enemy over thousands of miles away. The organization 
of that air power had undergone a transformation as well, growing from a part of the signal corps 
to become a largely independent air corps, permitted to make many of its own policy decisions 
and  able to train and organize as it saw fit.  
Despite their successes, however, the air corps still lacked an air-superiority fighter at the 
end of the interwar period. Because of the overconfidence of the air corps‟ commanders, 
especially Oscar Westover, fighters and pursuit aircraft did not develop as quickly as bombers 
and lagged behind significantly. In addition, isolationist policies did hinder the air corps‟ ability 
to produce large bombers in significant numbers until the last year of the interwar period, due to 
the necessity of appearing defensive in nature to secure funding from the government. 
The organization of the air corps played nearly as important a part to the advancement of 
aviation technology as the various research groups determined to advance it. As a part of the 
signal corps, airmen were expected to perform only scouting and infantry support missions, and 
therefore did not have much need for large long-range aircraft. As a semi-independent 
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organization, the air corps pursued research avenues that may have gone unsearched otherwise. 
In addition, the air corps‟ interaction with civilian designers helped advance civil aviation as 
well, which then returned dividends back to the air corps. Unlike the rest of the army, which was 
hindered by isolationist policies and interdepartmental bickering, as well as funding shortages, 
the air corps had a unified command structure and was able to make critical advances despite the 





NAVY: BATTLESHIPS AND BOMBADIERS 
America‟s return to isolationist policies following World War I and the adoption of 
international naval reduction treaty agreements almost immediately took their toll on the navy. 
Despite these restrictions, the navy was able to emerge from the period between the world wars 
with a comprehensive naval strategy and the technology to put that strategy into action. This era 
saw the development of many technologies and organizations that would be essential in World 
War II, such as purpose-built aircraft carriers, naval aviation, and radar. The navy managed this 
by reviewing its actions during and before World War I, identifying what it had done wrong, and 
learning to fix these problems, many of which mirrored the problems of the army. Following this 
step, the navy created a philosophy of quality over quantity to overcome the tonnage limitations 
imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty, and succeeded in developing in nearly every 
technological area before the end of the interwar period. 
THE FORMATION OF THE TREATY SYSTEM AND THE NAVY’S REACTION 
Navy policy emerging from World War I was uncoordinated and essentially revolved 
around a showdown between Adm. William Sims, known to be one of the major naval heroes of 
the war and commander of all naval forces in Europe, and Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the 
Navy. Sims had been rather outspoken in his contempt for Secretary Daniels during the war 
(largely due to the navy‟s and merchant marine‟s losses from German U-boats), and in response, 
Daniels launched a propaganda campaign against Sims in 1919. This culminated in Daniels 
promoting a senior naval officer over Sims for the position of Chief of Naval Operations. Daniels 
appointed Adm. Robert Coontz, who had no combat experience in the war and was junior to 
67 
 
Sims and several other wartime commanders.
167
 Sims returned fire, attempting to destroy 
Daniels‟ reputation as a competent leader of the navy, and political factors made their rivalry a 
central point of the 1920 Naval Affairs Committee, a congressional body designed to review 
naval conduct during World War I.
168
 However, Sims‟s obvious hatred of Daniels colored his 
testimony and allowed many senior officers in Washington to back Daniels, while Sims was 
backed by junior captains. The final Senate report was split between Republicans and 
Democrats, and nothing was really decided at the political level. Both parties were waiting for 
the elections of 1920, with Democrats waiting for a new leader and Republicans waiting for their 
turn to create a post-war policy.
169
  
Within the navy, however, the Senate Naval Investigation bore fruit. The committee 
analyzed the actions of the navy before and during World War I, and the problems it saw 
mirrored those seen in the army: competing bureaus made the organization inefficient as a 
whole, the navy lacked a consistent policy, and also lacked up-to-date war plans.
170
 In response 
to these findings, the navy called for the following changes: the navy needed to develop a single 
thinking and planning bureau; reorganization so that that all the bureaus were under the Chief of 
Naval Operations; the need for a commitment to research and development; that the navy prepare 
and organize for war at all times; and that the navy have a regular training schedule. In addition, 
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all senior staff officers must be qualified for their spots based on merit, rather than gaining high 
office for political reasons. As a result of these senate hearings, the navy avoided many of the 




In the elections of 1920, Republicans emerged with the presidency and majorities in both 
congressional houses. This Republican victory opened the door to the isolationist treaty system 
that limited the navy‟s budget and numbers, and would affect naval policy for the next two 
decades. Republican leaders restated America‟s unwillingness to involve itself in European 
affairs, and subtly hinted at seeking a new balance of power in the Pacific Rim. European nations 
had lost a great deal of power in the Pacific, and America found itself as one of the dominant 
powers in the region, with the other being Japan. Initially the government planned to continue to 
follow the wartime naval expansion program begun by the Big Navy Act of 1916 and the 
Destroyer Act of 1917. The goal was to expand the navy to equal Britain‟s, which had 33 
battleships and 9 battlecruisers to America‟s 16 battleships.
172
 As a result, the navy retained a 
fairly high budget directly after the war: $396 million 1921, comparable to the army‟s despite 
containing only half the manpower and substantially higher, even after inflation, compared to its 
1915 budget.
173
 However, Senator William Borah of Idaho took the idea of International 
Disarmament from the Versailles Treaty and proposed its application to America‟s armed forces. 
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In 1921, he advised adopting international treaties to set the maximum tonnage for the fleets of 
the Great Powers.  
The British responded enthusiastically to the idea, and an international conference in 
Washington D.C. was set for 1921 and concluded in 1922. The primary goal for the Washington 
Naval Conference was to set limits to the total tonnage allowed for capital ships within the 
nations participating in the conference.
174
 The current American naval war plans, under Plan 
ORANGE, assumed an offensive war with Japan, and assumed that the navy would lose 10% of 
its fighting ability for every 1,000 miles traveled in the open ocean. Using this ratio, the 
Americans came to the conclusion that they would need ten battleships for every six the Japanese 
had to retain a slight advantage, or a 10:6 ratio. The British demanded parity with the Americans, 
leading to a 10:10:6 ratio for the Americans, British, and Japanese respectively, which was 
simplified to the 5:5:3 agreement. In addition, the maximum size of a capital ship was set at 
35,000 tons and could not have guns larger than 16-inches.
175
 All other classes had to weigh in 
less than 10,000 tons and were limited to 8-inch guns.
176
 
The signing nations believed that international competition would be minimized by this 
ratio system and the treaty was seen as a major success because it both halted America‟s rapid 
naval expansion and forced England to surrender her naval supremacy.
177
 A ten-year halt to 
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battleship construction was included, prompting claims that the treaty sunk more battleships 
“than all the admirals of all the world would have sunk in a cycle of centuries.”
178
 The treaty 
limited the United States and Britain to 525,000 tons of battleships (or roughly 18 ships with a 
maximum tonnage of 35,000 tons). As a result, the navy was forced to decommission fifteen 
battleships and battlecruisers and effectively wasted over 300 million dollars.
179
 In 1922, the 
navy scrapped 376 vessels or keels, including six battleships, 15 battlecruisers, one cruiser, eight 
mine layers, twenty-five eagles (a type of patrol ship), two gunboats, and one hundred seventy 
three destroyers.
180
 However, the treaty allowed for 135,000 tons for aircraft carriers independent 
of the capital ship total. The naval budget also suffered greatly. In 1922, Congress cut the budget 
by $100 million and reduced the size of the navy by 20,000 men.
181
 
The main goal for the navy over the next two decades became finding a way to 
circumvent the restrictions placed upon it by the Washington Naval Conference and subsequent 
budget cuts. The navy, with its quantity limited, had to focus instead on quality, and to do that it 
turned in large part to the development of technology, especially naval air power. In 1921, the 
Navy Joint Board reported, “It has become imperative as a matter of national defense to provide 
for the maximum possible development of aviation…in the navy,” and in 1922, the Naval 
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Bureau of Aeronautics was established
182
 Over the next two decades, naval air power would go 
from being a small cadre of pilots from World War I to a strategically relevant fighting force.
183
  
THE RISE OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER 
With the moratorium on battleship construction, the navy began focusing its construction 
on aircraft carriers. The first carriers built were essentially experimental modifications on 
existing ships; the top of a ship was removed and a deck installed in its place. Initially, naval 
aircraft made their mark by acting as spotters for battleship guns, and had enough success that 
their opponents were silenced and further experimenting was allowed. The first carrier to enter 
US service was the Langley, which was modified from the fleet supply ship (or collier) USS 
Jupiter. This first carrier had a number of innovative designs, including two aircraft catapults. 
However, it was only regarded as experimental and had a number of major design problems, 
especially smoke dispersal, slow launch-time for aircraft, and a small total amount of embarked 
aircraft. In addition, it was too slow to keep up with the older battleships, making it difficult for 
its aircraft to fulfill their reconnaissance role. Its sister ships were eventually relegated as 
“training carriers” to keep them out of the total tonnage allowable for carriers by the Washington 
Naval Treaty; however, the Langley remained in active service as a carrier until 1937.
184
 The 
first two purpose-built carriers, the Lexington and Saratoga entered service in 1927.
185
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One of the major players in the development of early naval aviation came not from the 
navy, but from the army. William “Billy” Mitchell was the major proponent of an independent 
air force in the early 1920s, and this vision of an independent air force included all naval aviation 
as well. Mitchell believed that aerial warfare had become just as important as naval and ground 
warfare, and that to accomplish his goal of developing air power, all aircraft must be controlled 
by a central authority. In 1919 and 1920, he unsuccessfully attempted to gain control over 
aircraft carriers by classifying them as “air transports” rather than warships.
186
 Thwarted on this 
front, Mitchell decided to prove that the battleship was obsolete and could be destroyed by 
aircraft. He formally challenged the navy to allow him to prove this. Pressure from both the 
general public and Congress forced the navy to perform the test in 1921. Mitchell did succeed in 
sinking three test battleships, but violated most of the limits that the navy had imposed. The navy 
complained about these violations and countered that a manned ship with anti-air and damage 
control crews may have been able to save the targeted ships. However, the writing was on the 
wall; Mitchell had succeeded in sinking the ships.
187
  
The test did not succeed in the way Mitchell hoped, however. Rather than winning him 
control over ship-based aircraft, it instead forced the navy to develop its own aircraft in order to 
keep Mitchell out of their bailiwick. The navy organized its own Bureau of Aeronautics under 
the leadership of Rear Adm. William Moffett, whose career would be both longer and more 
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Even more important to the foundation and advancement of naval aviation was Rear 
Adm. William Moffett. Moffett took over the navy‟s newly created Bureau of Aeronautics in 
1921. Moffett was a decorated sailor at the time, with over thirty years in the navy and a 
Congressional Medal of Honor recipient. Prior to his appointment as the navy‟s head of aviation, 
Moffett‟s career solely consisted of surface warfare, most of it on battleships. His history as a 
battleship commander gave him credibility when he said that aviation must become a key 
component of naval strategy.
189
 In a dramatically different approach to Mitchell, Moffett created 
a philosophy within the naval aviation community of “naval officer first, pilot second.” This 
contrasted greatly with Mitchell‟s push for an independent air wing, and contributed to the 
reasons as to why naval aviation stayed part of the navy; the high commanders knew their pilots 
were loyal.
190
 Moffett turned naval aviation into one of the best aviation programs in the world. 
The navy flew its first all-metal aircraft in 1922 and commissioned all-metal designs by 1925.
191
 
The navy also claimed the title of the first naval aviation program in the world to regularly use 
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catapults on aircraft carriers.
192
 Moffett would continue to head the Bureau of Aviation until his 
death in an airship accident in 1933.
193
      
BOMBERS OR BATTLESHIPS? 
While the navy defended its air program from the air corps, it updated its battleships with 
new technology. Because of the Washington Conference, the navy was forbidden from building 
new battleships and was forced instead to update and upgrade the existing ships. The navy 
adopted a 7-year modernization plan, and designed most of the upgrades to protect the 
battleships from air attack. Unlike the air corps, the navy had an internal research organization, 
which allowed it to design many of these innovations and modernizations in-house, rather than 
using external contractors.
194
 Six of the old coal-burning battleships were converted to oil-
burning engines. This allowed the navy to concentrate on supplying its ships with one type of 
fuel, rather than having to transport both oil for new ships and coal for older ones. The oil-
burning engines also proved to be much more powerful and efficient. Builders strengthened the 
decks of the ships and added more armor. To make guns better able to target aircraft, the navy 
redesigned and replaced them with guns able to be aimed higher. Catapults designed to throw 
reconnaissance planes into the air were installed. The first was installed on the battleship USS 
Maryland in 1922.
195
 This new catapult design used smokeless powder rather than compressed 
air to accelerate aircraft. It was a much less cumbersome design and used new alloys that 
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allowed higher pressures and temperatures.
196
 “Duplex” radios were also developed. These 
radios were able to receive several different messages on the same antenna while simultaneously 
broadcasting. This allowed commanders a much better command and control ability while taking 
up less equipment space.
197
 Finally, “blister compartments” were added below sea-level to 
protect from torpedo attacks.
198
 The purpose of these compartments was not necessarily to 
protect against a physical bomb hit, but a near miss. A bomb that explodes near the ship at the 
waterline is actually more destructive because the explosion creates a shock wave, forcing the 
water around the explosion towards the target ship with great force.
199
 All these advancements 
played a role in the navy‟s developing technological superiority. 
The navy had to deal with an internal conflict of doctrines between advocates of the 
aircraft carrier and those who still favored the battleship as the main capital ship of the line. 
Because of the construction restrictions on battleships and battlecruisers, only aircraft carriers 
were built because they were the only capital ships the navy was permitted to build. However, 
the proponents of the battleship assumed that when the treaty expired in 1932, carrier 
construction would be replaced with battleship construction.
200
 Carrier proponents disagreed. Lt. 
Comm. H.B. Grow, writing in the Naval Institute‟s publication Proceedings detailed the rather 
ambiguous compromise to this conflict in 1921: that the battleship would be in great danger if 
left unprotected by aircraft; but it still remained the main capital ship of the navy; that whichever 
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fleet gained air superiority would most likely be the victor of a given engagement; that two 
2,000-pound bombs would disable or destroy any ship; and that naval aviation would be essential 
to fleet protection and must be built to the limits of the Washington Treaty.
201
 
Lt. Comm. O.C. Badger wrote that this was not the first time the battleship had been 
assumed obsolete; the same thing had been said of battleships when the torpedo boat was 
invented in the 1870s. The torpedo boat was a small, fast ship designed to get inside a 
battleship‟s defenses and launch torpedoes. They were somewhat effective, but the battleship 
was still around 60 years after its invention. Badger believed it would be much the same thing 
with the aircraft carrier and its airplanes. He also wrote that a carrier would be unable to take and 
hold a position like a battleship could and that aircraft were essentially raiders, not main combat 
units.
202
 Essentially, it was agreed that the battleship would remain the main ship of the fleet, but 
the carrier would be an absolutely essential element in a battle group. Two years later, Lt. Forrest 
Sherman expanded on this point, writing that the carrier‟s main goal must be to launch aircraft to 
locate and destroy an enemy fleet‟s carriers in order to maintain air superiority.
203
 
Highlighting the importance of air power to the navy was Comm. John Jackson of the US 
Navy. In 1922, he submitted a 101-point analysis of all things air to the US Naval Institute. His 
report included the capabilities of aircraft, types of aircraft, how to use aircraft (including 
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scouting, fleet defense, and attack), the aircraft carriers‟ role as capital ships, the importance of 




The first two carriers purpose-built for the navy were the Saratoga and the Lexington.
205
 
These ships, built from the keels of two battlecruisers on which construction had been stopped to 
meet the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, massed around 33,000 tons and could carry 
between seventy-five to ninety aircraft of various types.
206
 These carriers also had a small battery 
of 8-inch guns and smaller anti-aircraft guns, all of which could only fire to the starboard side 
due to the control tower on the port side. They also had the same blister compartments that had 
been previously installed on battleships. As these were the first purpose-built carriers, they 
underwent constant modification throughout their service careers, which included widening the 
deck, removing the catapults due to lack of use, and the addition of anti-aircraft machine guns.
207
  
The Lexington and Saratoga caused a debate between the carrier proponents, those who 
favored building a few “heavy” carriers like the Saratoga-class and those who preferred a 
smaller “light” carrier.
208
 As mentioned above, the navy was only permitted to build 135,000 
tons of aircraft carriers, and the Lexington and Saratoga used up nearly half of that total tonnage. 
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This meant that they would only be able to build 4-5 carriers of comparable size to a Saratoga 
(two 33,000-ton carriers and two or three 25-27,000-ton carriers), which limited the number of 
places the navy could deploy at a given time. The alternative was that the navy could build a 
larger number of light carriers with the remaining 69,000 available tons. The trade-off would be 
that their landing decks would be less stable (a lighter ship would be less able to stay level in 
heavy seas) and that they would hold fewer aircraft.  
The navy designed a number of different carrier sizes to succeed the Saratoga-class, with 
each plan projected to allow a certain number of ships to be built. For example, the navy could 
build two 27,000 ton carriers, or five 13,800 ton carriers.
209
 Having smaller carriers meant that 
each individual carrier would be less effective. However, having more carriers meant the navy 
could deploy carriers to more fleets, or even multiple carriers to the same fleet. The latter option 
would allow for some measure of redundancy should one carrier suffer damage, either due to 
attack or a mechanical failure. It is worth noting that these plans were only a debate while the 
naval treaties held. In the event of a war, tonnage would be unlimited and the navy would be free 
to build full-sized carriers.
210
 
In 1930, a compromise was reached in the debate with the creation of the Ranger-class, a 
medium carrier about half the size of a Saratoga (14,500 tons), which could hold about eighty 
planes.
211
 The carrier was able to carry this many aircraft because a larger percentage of its total 
size was committed to hanger space, allowing it to carry nearly as many aircraft as the much 
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 In addition, the new design incorporated the flush-deck, a design used by 
British carriers, which had come to be preferred by American pilots. The flush-deck incorporated 
a wider deck, which made it the optimal design for launching aircraft and minimized the 
potential for landing accidents. However, it also necessitated the removal of the defensive guns, 
making the carrier dependent on its aircraft and the rest of the battle group for protection.
213
  
NAVAL AVIATION SURGES AHEAD 
While the navy was designing its second generation of purpose-built aircraft carriers, 
significant technological advances developed within naval aviation. This new wave of planes 
utilized the radial engine, an air-cooled engine developed for the air corps but adopted by the 
navy‟s Bureau of Aeronautics. The radial engine was reliable for over 300 hours of flight time 
between maintenance cycles, as opposed to earlier water-cooled engines which could only 
operate for fifty hours. In addition, the radial engines were more powerful and could operate at 
higher altitudes and for longer ranges. The additional power from the engine allowed aircraft 
engineers to shorten an aircraft‟s wings. This was ideal for the navy as shorter wings meant a 
smaller plane, thus making more room for additional aircraft on a given carrier. All-metal 
propellers were beginning to become standard, and the NACA-designed Roots Supercharger 
allowed for higher maximum altitudes and faster climbing.
214
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Metal designs developed somewhat earlier in the navy than in the air corps for the very 
important reason that naval aircraft had to deal with water, while generally air corps aircraft did 
not. Properly treated metals have a much higher resistance to water damage than do wood and 
cloth, especially salt water.
215
 Wood-and-cloth aircraft also absorbed water, weighing the aircraft 
down.
216
 However, metal aircraft did prove much more difficult to repair. In the field, even 
minor damage could down-check an aircraft.
217
  
In1925, the navy developed the PN-9 patrol plane. This was the navy‟s first aircraft made 
almost entirely of metal, rather than wood and cloth, and almost immediately set world records 
for endurance.
218
 The navy considered long-range aerial reconnaissance crucial. They still 
considered Japan to be their primary potential adversary and needed the ability to scout vast 
stretches of the Pacific Ocean to locate Japanese fleets.
219
 In 1926, the efficiency of air-cooled 
engines had increased by four-hundred percent over wartime engines, the size had been reduced 
by one-third their wartime size, and they had finally overtaken water-cooled engines in fuel 
economy and horsepower-to-weight ratio.
220
 Also in 1926, the navy stopped purchasing new 
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Because of these improvements in engine power and efficiency and the development of 
sturdier wings, dive bombing developed in this period, although it would not reach its full 
potential until the all-metal aircraft of the 1930s came into development. Once all-metal aircraft 
were developed, the additional strength given by the metal frame allowed aircraft to move faster 
and turn more sharply; both of these abilities are vital for dive-bombing. However, by 1927, it 
had become apparent that a few dive bombers could strike a battleship several times before the 
battleship‟s anti-air turrets (and, more specifically, its gunners) could target them. Adm. Sims 
claimed that a small fast carrier launching dive bombers with a 200-mile range could “destroy or 
disable a battleship alone” and the carrier was “a capital ship of much greater offensive power 
than any battleship.”
222
  Although a single dive bomber can only carry one 1000-pound bomb, it 
can hit its target with near-100 percent accuracy from a range of 150 miles. Battleships, on the 
other hand, could fire up to 16,000 tons of ordinance at a time. But at long range (approximately 
seventeen miles), it could only hit with 5% accuracy – about 800 pounds of explosives. This 
means, given one shot at a target, the dive bomber could deliver more ordinance at nearly ten 
times the range.
223
 This had the additional effect of forcing battleship proponents to develop 
more effective anti-air batteries to counter possible air attacks.  
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Navy engineers also installed radiophones in aircraft near the end of the decade, which 
greatly improved the effectiveness of coordinated movements between aircraft and ships. By the 
end of the 1920s, navy strategists considered aircraft as primarily offensive weapons that should 
be used en masse against enemy carriers, preferably before enemy aircraft could be deployed. 
Commanders also considered aircraft the best defense against other aircraft, but anti-air cannons 
were being rapidly developed.
224
 Lt. Comm. R.K. Turner developed a method of anti-aircraft fire 
control using multiple ships in order to maximize the chances of hitting a target aircraft, 
especially torpedo planes.
225
 Because of this focus on both offense and defense, the navy made 
significantly more progress in the development of fighter aircraft than the air corps in the 
interwar period.
226
 The navy also committed to funding large-scale training exercises to develop 
unified tactics between air and surface units. These exercises often contained large sections of 
the fleet and hundreds of aircraft, and were scheduled on a regular basis.
227
  
THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
The last years of the 1920s saw the beginnings of a naval arms race in the development 
and construction of cruisers. Cruisers and destroyers were unaffected by the Washington Naval 
Treaty and were becoming bigger and more powerful, especially those built by the United States 
and Japan. The Butler Cruiser Acts of 1924 and 1929 allowed for the construction of several 
American cruisers and forced Britain and Japan to follow suit by building more cruisers of their 
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own. The Geneva Conference in 1927 attempted to curtail this arms race before it really got 
started, but the three major powers, Japan, Britain, and America, were unable to reach an 
agreement as to the total tonnage allowed for cruisers, and Japan was reluctant to once again 




The onset of the Great Depression changed the dynamic of international naval relations. 
None of the major naval powers had the ability to keep the funding for naval construction at the 
level it had been previously, which made them more open to renewed discussions about limiting 
the tonnage and construction of cruisers. It even temporarily convinced the naval brass that 
budget cuts were unavoidable. The London Naval Conference of 1930 was convened to address 
these armament issues. The American diplomats disagreed with the navy in terms of the potential 
threat posed by Japan and did not believe that Japan posed a credible threat to China, let alone 
the rest of the Pacific.  
As a result, the Americans, British, and Japanese reached a compromise, allowing the 
Americans to build 14 heavy cruisers between 1930 and 1936, with at least three to be built after 
1934. Submarine tonnage would be equal between the powers, and a 10:10:7 ratio was set for 
destroyers.
229
 The British attempted to downgrade the allowable tonnage of a cruiser from 
10,000 tons to 7,000, but both Pacific powers rejected this plan. The navy saw the 10:10:7 
compromise as a setback, believing that a 5:5:3 ratio was a necessity across all classes. However, 
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Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. William Pratt urged Congress to ratify the treaty. His 
reasoning was that both Japan and Britain had already reached their allotment for cruisers, and 
America would be able to build 14 more of them with the latest technology. The treaty gave 
“absolute parity” between the United States and Great Britain across all ship types and extended 
the agreements of the Washington Naval Conference for another five years.
230
  
Despite opposition from the Navy League, a lobby of civilians and naval veterans 
dedicated to supporting the navy, the treaty was ratified. President Hoover then further slashed 
the naval budget and put a one-year halt on construction in 1932.
231
  In addition, Hoover forced 
Pratt to separate the fleet into thirds, and rotate a third of the fleet into inactive reserves every 
year. This would save about fifty million dollars in operating costs, but would leave an already 
undermanned fleet even thinner.
232
   
When Franklin Roosevelt took over the presidency in 1933, he brought a short attention 
span and an incomplete view of foreign affairs to the navy. The one good thing he did was 
appoint Senator Claude Swanson as the Secretary of the Navy. Swanson largely left the navy 
alone and let the admirals run it. His contributions to the navy consisted of lobbying for funding 
from Congress and building the navy up to its treaty limits.
233
  
Initially, Roosevelt continued Hoover‟s policy of the one-third reserve, but his policy of 
deficit spending and Japan‟s continued aggression in China quickly brought it to an end. In the 
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1933 National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA), Roosevelt earmarked $238 million dollars for 
naval construction. Thirty-three ships were planned, mostly destroyers, and both carriers and 
cruisers were built up to their treaty limits. Battleship modernization neared completion and the 
new CNO, Adm. William Standley, prepared to replace the navy‟s World War I-era battleships. 
The navy stated that this construction would employ over 18,000 Americans and would impact 
nearly every area of industry. In addition, 85 percent of the money spent on new construction 




Rear Adm. Ernest King took over the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1933, when Rear Adm. 
Moffett was killed in a dirigible accident. King effectively ended the navy‟s airship program and 
began to focus on replacing the navy‟s remaining biplanes with the new metal monoplanes. 
Torpedo bombers were developed and used the new Norden bombsight. The Norden bombsight 
would be made famous by the US Army Air Force during World War II, but Norden originally 
designed it for the navy. The sight used a combination of an optical bombsight and an automatic 
pilot – up to this point, bombsights had been jury-rigged by the aircraft crew.
235
 King also 
dismissed many of the carrier‟s secondary assignments such as reconnaissance, submarine 
hunting, and land attack, focusing instead on capital-ship assault and fleet defense.
236
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THE END OF THE TREATY FLEET 
In 1934, Roosevelt authorized the construction of another 102 ships, with the belief that 
he would have to cancel the authorization after the Second London Naval Conference; the 
conference was to take place later that year. Japan denounced the Washington Naval Treaty in 
1934, and made it perfectly clear that it would not renew the London Treaty of 1930. In 
December of 1935, when Japan demanded naval parity across all ship types, the conference 
rapidly fell apart. Japan walked out of the conference, and the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France signed a weak treaty that in theory extended the terms of both the 




Because Japan began to expand its navy without inhibitions imposed by international 
treaties, Roosevelt was forced to propose the 1935 Emergency Relief Act, which authorized the 
construction of an aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and various smaller types, and Congress 
increased the navy‟s budget to nearly $100 million over its pre-Washington Treaty budget, to 
$490 million, with $26 million earmarked specifically for naval aviation.
238
 Britain soon backed 
out of the largely meaningless Second London Naval Treaty in 1936, and all the major naval 
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In January 1936, Roosevelt announced plans to build a navy able to defend the country 
from an offensive war, and that he would begin construction on two new battleships, the first 
new battleships to be built in nearly two decades.
240
 These two battleships would be of the North 
Carolina-class, a brand new class of battleship, and would be built with 16-inch guns as opposed 
to the 14-inch guns allowed by the treaties. This was permissible because the treaties had an 
escape clause written in allowing other nations to break said treaties once another nation had. 
Because Japan was building battleships with 16-inch guns, nothing prevented America and 
Britain from doing so as well.  
By this point, it was increasingly obvious that a war, or at the very least a showdown, 
between Japan and the United States was brewing. However, the navy had collectively believed a 
Pacific war had been inevitable for decades.
241
 European nations began to rearm as well, 
especially Britain and Germany. Japanese expansionism into China was becoming more 
pronounced. However, Roosevelt was unprepared to do anything about it in 1936, and his 
“strategic planning” was often inconsistent and nonsensical.  
By the end of 1938, the US Navy had a total of 533 warships, a 100-ship increase from 
the year before. Most of these ships were built out of the funds granted by the Emergency Relief 
Act and the NIRA, and included three carriers: the Yorktown, the Enterprise, and the Wasp. This 
allowed the navy to focus on new battleships, and Roosevelt approved funding to build two new 
South Dakota-class battleships per year for two years. After two years, newer classes were 
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developed and the navy stopped producing South Dakota-class ships. In addition, funding was 
received for two Hornet-class carriers, nine cruisers, twenty-three destroyers, two submarines, 
and one thousand aircraft.
242
 Finally, in 1939, Congress approved the construction of two Iowa-
class battleships and the widening of the Panama Canal to allow these new ships to use it, in 
addition to a budget of $770,473,241. These Iowa-class ships were arguably the most successful 
battleships in history, as they remained in service for nearly 50 years, and their nine 16-inch 
main cannons gave them one of the most powerful broadsides of the war.
243
  
There were a number of issues in the development of technology during this final period, 
and many of them were the fault of politicians rather than the navy itself. Because of the large 
push to produce capital ships such as battleships and large carriers to prepare for war, the navy 
largely ignored the construction of lighter ships, especially cruisers; between 1936 and 1939, 
only one additional cruiser was laid down for construction. This is somewhat understandable, as 
the newest battleship in the fleet was built in 1918 – most of the cruisers and all of the carriers 
were a decade younger.
244
 The result was a fleet full of fast, modern battleships, but very few 
new lighter units that were needed to protect them. In fact, the new battleships could outrun these 
smaller units, meaning that they must either slow down to allow the support ships to keep pace, 
or travel without a protective screen of smaller ships. In addition, aircraft carriers were still 
relegated to designs drawn up under the treaty program, meaning that their size was restricted. 
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The end of the treaties meant the end of these restrictions, but new designs lagged behind due to 
the renewed focus on battleships.
245
 
Despite the priority shifting away from smaller ships in the late 1930s, there were many 
new technological innovations that were implemented on the new construction. Radar was 
installed on several destroyers and cruisers (as well as on four battleships) in order to spot 
incoming aircraft, although doctrine would not be established on its use until the war. The Mark 
XIV torpedo was developed with a range of over 9,000 yards and a top speed of nearly fifty 
knots. In addition, it no longer relied on impact to detonate; instead, it had a “magnetic 
exploder,” or proximity fuse, which allowed the torpedo to do damage on direct hits and near 
misses. All these new technologies would greatly influence and aid the navy‟s war-fighting 
ability during World War II.
246
 
The largest gap in naval preparedness coming out of the interwar period was in support 
ships. After the collapse of the naval disarmament treaties, carriers and battleships were built 
stronger and faster than ever before. In the case of battleships, they were fast enough to outrun 
their own screen. Eight of these fast battleships were laid down between 1936 and 1939, but only 
one cruiser fast enough to keep up was authorized for construction. This left the navy critically 
unprepared numerically to fight a two-ocean war.
247
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In addition, the possibility of a two-ocean war came as a surprise to the US Navy. Since 
World War I, the navy had focused on Japan as its most-likely opponent and had planned its 
strategy around that fact in Plan ORANGE. The rise in European tensions forced a paradigm 
shift in the navy and Plan ORANGE was scrapped in favor of the new RAINBOW Plans, which 
were designed to meet a number of different possible conflicts, including a simultaneous war in 
the Atlantic and the Pacific. These new plans required a larger navy, and those numbers would 
not be available until after World War II began.
248
 
Despite not being prepared numerically, the navy had all the technology it would need to 
fight World War II on equal terms. It had both modern aircraft carriers and battleships and the 
technology to build the ships needed to support them (although the number built was small). The 
blame for the navy‟s lack of numerical power can be laid at the feet of isolationist politicians and 
later, Roosevelt himself, as well as the disarmament treaties to which the navy had, in part, 
agreed. Despite the isolationists‟ attempt to limit the navy‟s fighting power, it had developed and 
deployed the aircraft carrier in order to make up for the limited tonnage it was allowed. The navy 
had devised a cohesive strategy for both aircraft and surface ships to work together. Finally, the 
ships that the navy was permitted to build both during and after the treaty system were some of 
the most modern in the world, and those built before the treaty system were constantly updated 
with new technology to keep them as modern as possible. Also, when war appeared on the 
horizon, the United States was prepared to initiate a massive building program to bring the navy 
up to strength. Because of this, the navy was able to enter World War II having developed nearly 
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all the technology it would need to effectively fight a two-ocean war. The only remaining task 





 The twenty year period between the world wars heralded in an astounding number of new 
technologies. The army, air corps, and navy, to varying degrees of success, all made progress on 
a number of technological fronts between 1919 and 1939. They did this despite the plethora of 
barriers erected in their path, be they political, budgetary, or organizational. The success or 
failure of these military branches to develop new technology cannot be accounted for simply by 
funding, individuals, or organizations, but rather, by a combination of all these factors.  
The army was the branch most adversely affected by Congress‟s isolationist policies, 
organizational inefficiency, and budget cuts. The National Defense Act of 1920 not only severely 
cut both the army‟s manpower and budget, but also brought back an organizational system that 
had proven inefficient and had been replaced by a more effective, top-down structure. The 
actions taken by Congress set the tone for the rest of the interwar period for the army, by not 
allowing it the manpower to properly perform its duties and reinstituting an obsolete command 
strategy and giving power back to the department heads, rather than consolidating power in the 
army chief of staff as Gen. Peyton March envisioned. Although most of the chiefs of staff during 
the interwar period favored modernization of the army, many of the department heads did not. 
This was further exacerbated by a lack of proper funding, making it nearly impossible for the 
army to manufacture any technological gains they did achieve. The two tanks designed in the 
1920s, the Medium A and the Christie, were put aside in favor of the armored car at the 
discretion of the chief of the infantry division. The standard firearm for the army was still the 
1903 Springfield, despite the development of the M1. Finally, due to the lack of a standard truck 
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design and a slashed training budget, in addition to obsolete weaponry, the army failed to form a 
cohesive strategy involving mechanized weaponry and motorized transport. At the end of the 
interwar period, the army had not made significant progress on tanks, artillery, mechanization, or 
small arms. What little modern material it did have were in short supply and largely untested in 
the field. 
 The air corps, despite being part of the army, finished the interwar period in stark contrast 
to its parent branch. By partially separating itself from the army, it overcame many of the army‟s 
organizational inefficiencies, and a good marketing campaign allowed the air corps to gain 
funding to develop “defensive” strategic bombers. Billy Mitchell‟s influence on the air service at 
the end of World War I gave the army airmen a sense of purpose and identity. His publicity 
stunts made the air service, the public, and the government aware of the potential of military 
aircraft, be it defending the heartland or sinking battleships off the coast. Even after Mitchell‟s 
resignation, the air service and later the air corps remained a cohesive unit under the leadership 
of Gen. Mason Patrick and his successors.  
After the formation of the air corps, Patrick made army aviation a nearly closed society, 
promoting from within, forming a culture, and setting goals apart from the army. Because of this 
unified command structure and a cohesive goal, it was able to find a niche for itself within the 
army and then pitch itself as a defensive organization apart from the army. The idea of strategic 
bombing (being able to attack targets far behind enemy lines), was very appealing to the military 
establishment. Even more importantly, being able to market this idea with the purpose of 
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defending the coastline, rather than attacking cities, made the air corps politically viable. These 
changes in presentation allowed the air corps to secure funding independent of the rest of the 
army.  
Using a combination of this funding, plus government organizations such as the NACA 
and private corporations such as the Martin Company and Boeing, the air corps made significant 
technological progress, advancing from wood-and-cloth aircraft at the beginning of the 1920s to 
all-metal, single-wing aircraft at the end of the 1930s. However, the air corps did not make 
significant advancements in fighter aircraft until the very end of the interwar period, assuming 
that its bombers would be able to either outfly or outgun any defenders. The fighters it did have 
were either too slow to keep up with the new bombers, or too underpowered to reach the 
altitudes where bombers flew. The P-38 would eventually become a serviceable fighter during 
World War II, but at the end of the 1930s it was still a test project plagued with mechanical 
problems. Overall, the air corps made significant progress during the interwar period, but there 
remained some oversights in 1939. 
 The navy began the Great War with several of the same problems as the army: a system 
of bureaus dominated the command structure and a culture of treating peacetime and wartime 
differently in terms of preparation and readiness. At the end of World War I, the navy dealt with 
these problems immediately during the 1920 Senate Naval Investigation, taking power from the 
bureau chiefs and giving it to the chief of naval operations. In addition, they committed 
themselves to preparing for war at all times through constant upgrades and regularly scheduled, 
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large-scale training exercises. These organizational factors allowed the navy to overcome both 
funding deficits and tonnage limits. 
In the wake of World War I, the navy was affected by a series of international treaties 
designed to weaken navies to the point that they could not be used offensively. As a result, 
tonnages were strictly limited for capital ships, such as battleships, battlecruisers, and aircraft 
carriers. In 1930, smaller ships such as cruisers and destroyers became limited as well. Ironically, 
these two treaties actually fostered many technological innovations. The navy responded to these 
handicaps by forming a culture of quality over quantity. Existing ships were upgraded constantly 
during the interwar period with better guns, armor, and engines. The navy converted almost 
entirely to oil-based engines, rather than coal-fired engines. 
 In addition, the navy began to further develop the aircraft carrier, especially after Billy 
Mitchell‟s tests proved that aircraft could sink battleships. These carriers had to conform to a 
compromise between holding enough aircraft to be effective, and fitting into tonnage limits to 
allow the navy to build enough of them to put at least one carrier in each fleet. As a result, the 
carriers built in the interwar period were somewhat undersized, but contained all the design 
elements needed to build full-sized carriers once the naval treaties fell apart in the mid-1930s. 
The navy also developed their own aircraft independent of the air corps, designed to defend and 
attack ships. Because of these different goals, the navy actually developed better fighter aircraft 
than the air corps prior to World War II. The navy also developed all-metal aircraft long before 
the air corps, due to metal‟s superior durability in water.  
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Because of naval command‟s obsession with improving the quality of its hardware during 
the 1920s and 1930s, when the naval treaties dissolved, the navy was prepared to build entirely 
modern battleships that were stronger, faster, and better armed than ever. However, due to the 
twenty-year hiatus on battleship construction, the navy focused solely on building battleships for 
the final years before World War II. They built no new carriers and very few smaller ships like 
cruisers and destroyers, leaving them with a small number of modern ships of these types. This 
was not a technological oversight, however. All the technology was available to build larger 
aircraft carriers and faster cruisers; the navy simply had not built them yet. 
 The argument could be made for either the navy or the air corps in terms of which service 
improved most technologically between 1919 and 1939. Both the air corps and the navy 
considered the development of cutting-edge aircraft critical. The navy developed an entirely new 
class of ship, the aircraft carrier, to transport and launch these new aircraft. It also vastly 
improved the performance of its more conventional arsenal despite the restrictions placed upon it 
by the international naval treaties and budget constraints. The air corps, on the other hand, 
effectively invented itself out of nothing, starting as the air service, a division of the signal corps, 
in 1919 to being a largely independent military branch in 1939. Technologically, it had advanced 
from being a small group of wood and cloth observational biplanes to a significant force of all-
metal bombers.  
 The army, hardest hit by budget cuts and manpower restrictions do to isolationist 
domestic policies, was also the clear loser in terms of technological development. Most of the 
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army still used the same weaponry as they had at the end of World War I for both artillery and 
small-arms. What few technological developments that were made were not produced in large 
quantity and were never tested in large-scale maneuvers. As a result, the army ended the interwar 
period largely unprepared for World War II. 
 There are a number of comparisons to be drawn between the interwar period and the 
current military situation. With a tenuous economy and the potential for upcoming budget cuts to 
the military, it is more important than ever for today‟s commanders to look to the past to see 
what mistakes were made, which were averted, and the best ways to maintain a strong and 
prepared military presence. In the face of budgetary shortfalls, the most important factor is to 
have a unified command structure, headed by one department, rather than having a collective of 
different bureaus interested only on pursuing their own agenda at the expense of all others. 
Equally as important is having common goals throughout the organization. In the air corps, it 
was carving out a specialized niche, followed by the development of strategic bombing. In the 
navy, the goal became to be ready for war with cutting edge weaponry, despite the challenge of 
international treaties and budget cuts. Finally, many interwar success stories were due to civilian 
agencies and corporations working with and for the military. The air corps and navy each 
realized that the private sector could be a boon to a research and development programs. Both 
the air corps and navy relied heavily on civilian aviation to develop new aircraft and associated 
technologies. United, these lessons as learned from the interwar period provide not only 
explanations for differing levels of success by each branch, but also provide a blueprint for future 
technological development for today‟s military, regardless of obstacles.   
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